Extra-Legal Information Transfer During Eyewitness Identification by Evelo, Andrew J
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
6-2020 
Extra-Legal Information Transfer During Eyewitness Identification 
Andrew J. Evelo 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3750 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 





















A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the 




























ANDREW JOSEPH EVELO 





Extra-Legal Information Transfer During Eyewitness Identification 
by 





This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in 
Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of 







Date  Margaret Bull Kovera 
Chair of Examining Committee 
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by 
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Advisor: Margaret Bull Kovera 
Researchers recommend that eyewitness lineups be conducted by administrators who do not 
know which lineup member is the suspect (i.e., that lineups be administered in a double-blind 
manner). Research on the effects of administrator knowledge generally support the idea that 
single-blind lineups damage the integrity of the lineup procedure and can lead to increases in the 
false identification of innocent suspects (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). This body of research has 
either explicitly stated or implicitly assumed that these negative effects are the result of 
leakage—that is, administrators are conveying information to witnesses about which lineup 
member to pick. Borrowing from dual-process models in social psychology, we used two studies 
to test an administrator-eyewitness interaction model in which information is passed from the 
single-blind administrator to the eyewitness if and only if there is motivation and ability to do so. 
Study 1 (the Cue Transmission Study) failed to replicate administrator influence effects and was 
unable to test their moderation. The results of Study 2 (the Cue Reception Study), however, 
indicated that a witness’s ability and motivation were crucial to the interpretation of cueing 
information from an administrator. The later results support the use of social dual-process 
models in understanding lineup interactions, signify the importance of understanding witness 
variables—not just administrator behavior—in lineups, and continue to support the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A large body of research and growing list of DNA exonerations show that eyewitness 
identification can be problematic. Psychological researchers have made a number of 
recommendations to improve identification accuracy (Wells et al., 1998, 2020). These reforms 
deal with system variables—so called because these factors can be controlled by the justice 
system to improve the reliability of lineup identifications. There are a number of 
recommendations. For example, investigators should ensure suspects do not stand out from other 
lineup members, lineups contain only one suspect, lineups are video recorded, and witnesses’ 
confidence in their identifications is obtained immediately after the identification. Of these 
recommendations, one crucial recommendation for maintaining fair lineups is that lineups be 
conducted by an administrator who does not know the identity of the suspect (i.e., lineup should 
be double-blind; Kovera & Evelo, 2017). 
The double-blind administration recommendation stems primarily from research on 
interpersonal expectancy effects. Expectancy effects are self-fulfilling prophesies; they occur 
when some outcome is not the result of the actual phenomenon of interest but instead is the result 
of the expectations themselves (Michael et al., 2012). Interpersonal expectancy effects occur 
during a social interaction in which one person’s expectations affect the behavior of another 
(Rosenthal, 2002). The concern for lineups is that administrators’ knowledge of the suspect’s 
identity will cause the administrator to emit subtle cues regarding the suspect’s identity; these 
cues will influence witnesses’ identification accuracy by increasing identifications of the suspect 
irrespective of guilt. 
The limited empirical research on single-blind lineups generally supports the claim that 





suspect) unfairly influence lineups in multiple ways (Kovera & Evelo, 2017), including getting 
the witness to pick the suspect (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera, 2009 ), increasing successful 
witnesses confidence (e.g., Wells & Bradfield, 1998), and selectively recording results consistent 
with their hypothesis (e.g., Rodriguez & Berry, 2019). These biases result from administrator 
cueing of witnesses, and this cueing has applied and theoretical consequences. From an applied 
standpoint, the courts assume that eyewitness memory is the result of the witnessed event, not 
the behavior of the administrator. From a theoretical standpoint, the transmission and receipt of 
nonverbal cues supports a model of expectancy effects (Jussim, 1986; Rosenthal, 2002; Trusz & 
Bąbel, 2016) that has rarely been studied in its entirety. The purpose of the current project is to 
study the transmission and receipt of potentially biasing information through the application of 
Rosenthal’s Expectancy Effect Model (1994, 2002) and extending this model into an 
administrator-eyewitness interaction model.  
Expectancy Effects 
Expectancy effects are self-fulfilling prophecies in which a person’s expectations for a 
given outcome cause that outcome to occur (Michael et al., 2012; Trusz & Bąbel, 2016). One of 
the earliest definitions comes from Merton (p. 195, 1948, emphasis in original) who said a “self-
fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior 
which makes the originally false conception come true.” The placebo effect—probably the most 
well know expectancy effect—occurs when psychological or physiological changes occur due to 
inert medications that are believed to have the effect (Kirsch, 1985; Price et al., 2008). More 
generally, a person’s expectations can affect their behaviors (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1997), 





relationships (e.g., Downey et al., 1998). These effects occur in myriad situations, including legal 
settings (Hart, 1995; Kassin et al., 2003). 
The research most applicable to the lineup procedure is on interpersonal expectancy 
effects. Intrapersonal expectancy effects (like the placebo effect) deal with a how a person’s 
expectations affect their own behaviors or outcomes; interpersonal expectancy effects deal with 
how a person’s expectations affect someone else’s behaviors or outcomes (for reviews, see 
Rosenthal, 2002; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978; Trusz & Bąbel, 2016). Here, we will refer to the 
former as the expecter and the latter as the target.   
Two classic experiments best illustrate how an expecter’s expectations can affect a 
target’s outcome. In one study, the expecters were undergraduates teaching mice (the targets) a 
maze task using operant conditioning (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963a). By random assignment, the 
researchers told some of the students that their mice were “smart” and others that their mice were 
“dull.” In line with the students’ expectations, “dull” mice took longer to learn the task than did 
“smart” mice. In a similar experiment, experimenters manipulated teachers’ expectations by 
telling them that their students had taken a test suggesting that certain students were “spurters” 
who would show substantial gains in performance over the next year; in fact, the labels were 
randomly assigned to the students (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). After a year, the “spurters” 
showed IQ gains consistent with the teachers’ expectations (especially those in lower grades). 
Rosenthal (2002; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978) hypothesized that teachers treated the “spurters” 
differently—possibly creating a warmer environment, spending more time with them, giving 
them more opportunities to succeed, and giving them better feedback—because the teachers 
expected them to do well. It was the teachers’ expectations and differential behavior—not any 





This expectancy effect research and other social research being conducted at the time 
raised concerns about experimenter bias in behavioral research (Weber & Cook, 1972). The fear 
was that the behavior of research participants was not the result of the independent variables but 
the result of the researchers’ expectations—that is their hypotheses. Rosenthal and Fode (1963b) 
tested this experimentally in a series of three studies in which they assigned participants to be 
either the “experimenter” or the “subject.” Subjects rated neutral faces on how much apparent 
success they were expressing on a scale from -10 (extreme failure) to +10 (extreme success). The 
researchers manipulated the participant experimenters’ expectations by telling half that the 
results should indicate failure (-5) while telling the others that the results should indicate success 
(+5). The researchers also informed the participant experimenters that the results were well 
established and that they would be paid more for doing a good job. Mean ratings of the faces 
were significantly different and in the direction of the experimenter’s positive (+4.05) or 
negative (-0.95) expectations. Participant experimenters were able to convey their hypotheses to 
the participant targets, who acted on that information.  
Because of Rosenthal’s studies and others, psychologists and other social scientists began 
to worry about hypothesis leakage—the process by which participants learn what was being 
studied during an experiment. Orne (1962) noted that humans are not passive subjects and they 
have a stake in the experimental outcome; participants are spending their time and they want to 
know it was worthwhile or contributed to science. Because they have a stake in the outcome, 
experimental participants try to discern the research hypothesis through cues Orne called demand 
characteristics. He argued that even if the cues are meager, all participants must do this at some 
level because they assume all experiments have a hidden purpose. Participants are many times 





different experimental conditions—sometimes called hypothesis leakage—and these differences 
affect their behavior (Weber & Cook, 1972). Participants tend to act in a way consistent with the 
inferred hypothesis (i.e., the expectation of the experimenter), not out of a desire to confirm the 
hypothesis per se, but out of a desire to be evaluated positively by the experimenters (Weber & 
Cook, 1972). In other words, they are motivated to both seem competent and help scientific 
progress. Although experimenters may not be able to control this motivation on part of 
participants, double-blind procedures can help limit both experimenter bias and demand 
characteristics (Rosenthal, 1976; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008; Shadish et al., 2002). 
The relation between researcher expectancy effects and interpersonal expectancy effects 
is theoretically important because lineup procedures are closely linked with experimental 
procedures. Scholars have likened lineups to an experiment that is designed to test the theory that 
the suspect of a crime is the perpetrator (Wells & Luus, 1990). This analogy relies on the fact 
that many aspects of the lineup have experiment-like equivalents: administrators are like 
experimenters, witnesses are like participants, and the lineup is like the stimulus material. An 
administrator theorizes that the suspect is the culprit, and therefore hypothesizes that the witness 
will identify the suspect as the perpetrator. Like a true experiment, the results from the lineup 
may or may not be consistent with the administrator’s hypothesis (i.e., the witness may or may 
not identify the suspect). Even if the witness does not confirm the administrator’s hypothesis, 
there is some chance that the disconfirmation is due to factors such as random chance or 
predictable confounds (i.e., a Type I error). Therefore, administrators—in much the same way as 
scientists increase the validity of their inferences—can increase their certainty that a suspect 





One such control is double-blind procedures. Specifically, double-blind procedures can serve as 
a safeguard against experimenter expectancy effects and demand characteristics. 
Given the lineup-as-experimental analogy and the body of research on social influence, 
interpersonal expectancy effects can serve as a strong theoretical foundation to understand one of 
the ways in which lineup administrators’ expectations can affect eyewitness identification. It is 
likely that the process by which interpersonal expectancy effects operate (i.e., mediators) are 
likely similar to the way in which administrator knowledge effects operate. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the working model of interpersonal expectancy effects to understand and 
limit administrator effects on eyewitness behavior during identification procedures.  
The Interpersonal Expectancy Effect Mediation Model 
How, then, do interpersonal expectancy effects operate? Multiple models of interpersonal 
expectancy effects evolved concurrently in psychology, but all focused on the same three stages 
(Jussim, 1986; Rosenthal, 2002; Trusz & Bąbel, 2016). These stages are presented in Figure 1. 
As the model indicates, the expecter’s expectations (the independent variable) change the 
expecter’s behavior (the mediator), which leads to differences in the target’s behavior/outcome 
(the dependent variable). Figure 1 is a simplified version of the key relationship, which may have 
distal moderators (Rosenthal, 2002) and intermediate mediators (Jussim, 1968). Each stage 
presents an important question: 1) how are expectations formed, 2) what behaviors mediate the 
effect, and 3) what real or perceived behaviors change in the target? 
Forming Expectations 
False or unjustified expectations are the basis of self-fulfilling prophesies. These 
expectancies are formed through experience. Social information is not processed in a vacuum; 





Schemas are defined as cognitive categorizations of old information that aid a perceiver in the 
processing of new information (Fiske & Linville, 1980; Kelley, 1973). Because schemas help 
organize past experiences, they also aid in making predictions about future experiences and 
therefore produce (and are closely linked to) expectations about those future experiences. Past 
experience with an individual helps the perceiver anticipate the behavior of the same or similar 
individuals in the future.  
The schema that is activated in a perceiver—and therefore used to form expectations 
about other individuals—depends on the situation (Bem, 1972; Kelly, 1973). The activated 
schema in a given situation can then have a profound influence on expectations. Schemas can 
focus attention on certain stimuli, create expectations on what is being viewed, and therefore 
create blindness for unexpected stimuli or events (Simmons & Chabris, 1999; Simmons & 
Ambinder, 2005). The unexpectedness produced by schematic networks can also be seen in 
memory research. Schema inconsistent items are often remembered more vividly by the 
perceiver, likely because their unexpectedness lead to deeper processing, which increases 
memory for those items (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Pezdek et al., 1989). Schematic processing can 
also produce false memories in a perceiver for expected events that never actually occurred 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Finally, schematic expectations can change behavior (e.g., 
Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997). 
Mediating Behaviors 
Another important question for expectancy effects is what specific behavior creates the 
self-fulfilling prophesy. An expecter’s expectations cause them to exhibit a certain behavior. 





expecter behaviors will produce different target behaviors. A few classic effects illustrate this 
variety of expectancy effects. 
First, social scientists have studied self-fulfilling prophesies in communication behaviors. 
In one experiment, mixed gender interaction partners were told to communicate over the phone 
where they could not see each other (Snyder et al., 1977). Before the conversations, male 
participants received accurate biographical information and a purported picture of their partner; 
in actuality, the picture was a randomly assigned photo of an unattractive or attractive female not 
involved with the study. After receiving the information but before the conversation, the male 
participants rated their participants on a number of social traits. Attractive stereotypes affected 
the perceivers’ expectations about their conversation partner; males rated the females as less 
social when they were unattractive. More importantly, these expectations affected the men’s 
verbal behavior during the phone conversation. Third party judges rated men who anticipated an 
attractive woman as having more friendly traits: sociable, outgoing, humorous, bold, and others. 
Woman picked up on these differences in behaviors and acted similarly toward the men; both 
third party judges and the men themselves rated the women as less friendly when the man had 
received an unattractive photo. In this case, communication behaviors (e.g., warmness, interest, 
and humor) mediated the effect of attractiveness stereotypes in producing expectancy consistent 
interactions. 
A meta-analysis of the Pygmalion effect—the tendency for students to improve when 
their teachers expect them too—also showed the variety of behaviors that can serve as mediators 
of interpersonal expectancy effects (Harris & Rosenthal, 1985). The authors examined 31 
possible teacher behaviors in 135 studies that might mediate the effect. The behaviors varied 





instanced: teacher speech rate, nods towards the student, and smiles towards the student. On the 
other hand, some of the behaviors were general, large, and longitudinal: overall teacher warmth, 
amount of material presented to a student, and persistence with a student. They grouped these 31 
different behaviors into four different factors: climate (creating a warmer climate for high 
expectancy students), feedback (giving more feedback to high expectancy students), input 
(teaching more material to high expectancy students), and output (allow high expectancy 
students more chance to excel). For instance, the climate category might contain teacher 
behaviors like general positive warmth or eye contact whereas the feedback category may 
contain behaviors like praise or criticism. Teachers’ expectancies affected their behavior and in 
turn the teachers’ behavior affected their students’ outcomes. More to the point, the four factors 
did so with varying levels of strength. For instance, feedback tended to have a small effect (ra-b = 
.13, rb-c = .07) whereas input tended to have a large effect (ra-b = .26, rb-c = .33). In other words, 
there were many diverse behaviors that mediate the Pygmalion effect and these behaviors vary in 
relative importance. 
A final example is the classic case study of Clever Hans (Pfungst et al., 1911), the horse 
who could “solve” math problems by tapping his hoof. In this case, it was simple non-verbal 
posture changes that mediated the key effect. Experimental studies revealed that Hans’s behavior 
was solely the result of questioners’ expectations. When Hans reached the answer, the audience 
members, observers, or questioner would stop looking at Hans hoofs and stand or sit more 
upright.  The posture change would communicate to the horse that it was time to stop tapping 
(and earn a delicious carrot). However, Hans was unable to answer correctly when he was unable 
to see the questioner or when the questioner did not know the correct answer to the question. 





eyewitnesses’ identification decisions because it indicates that even small, unconscious, or 
unintentional behaviors can serve as a mediator for expectancy effects. 
Targets’ Behaviors 
The dependent variable of interest in expectancy effects are changes in the targets’ 
behaviors. Most models of experimenter expectancy effects focus on observable behavior 
changes in the target. Researchers have studied many behaviors that may change as a result of 
targets’ expectation, including animal behavior, student performance, social interactions, and 
more. Although target behavior is usually the principle focus of these studies, there may be other 
related outcomes that are not target behavior per se. These cases involve behavior or perceptual 
changes of the expecter which result in apparent behavior change in the target. Because 
expectancies are like hypotheses, research on hypothesis confirming behaviors is relevant; 
people tend to seek information that confirms rather than falsifies their hypotheses (Edwards & 
Smith; 1996; Nickerson, 1998, Wason, 1960). There may be additional cognitive or motivational 
effects on how this information is actually viewed (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Jussim, 1986, 
1989). Applied to interpersonal behavior, expecters may only seek or view evidence in a light 
that confirms their expectation (Neuberg, 2016).  
Relevance to Lineups 
These three stages of expectancy effects are applicable to lineups. Lineup administrators 
serve as the expecter while witnesses serve as the target. Administrators who construct the lineup 
know which lineup member is the suspect and—whether by past experience, the witness’s 
description, or from other probative evidence—expect that the witnesses will pick their suspect. 
Although this is not the only expectation that an administrator may have, it is the one that this 





instance, administrators may have expectations about the guilt of their suspect. However, these 
expectations are not about the target’s behavior and are therefore inconsistent with expectancy 
effect theory. Another possibility is that administrators may have expectations about the target’s 
behavior other than their specific choice. For instance, administrators may change their behavior 
(and affect the lineups outcome) if they expect the witness to struggle because other witnesses 
have struggled (see Douglass et al., 2005) or they know that the witness is fragile after being 
victimized (see Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Although these expectations are interesting and likely 
have downstream consequences, we focus here on expectations concerning which lineup member 
the witness will pick. 
Assuming that administrators do expect that the witness will pick the suspect, it is likely 
that this expectation will change the administrator’s behavior in some way which makes the 
witness more likely to choose the suspect. Because of this behavior change, the witness will 
select the suspect and confirm the expectations of the administrator. Here too there is an option 
of focus; we will be focusing on actual—not apparent—behavior change.  
A review of the literature on administrator influence indicates that some predictions 
based on this model are well supported by empirical evidence. However, it is also clear that some 
parts of the process have received only a little attention whereas other parts have received none 
at all.  
Research on Eyewitness and Administrator Interactions 
When the American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS) recommended double-blind 
administration of lineups, there was little research on administrator-eyewitness interactions; the 
recommendation came from what was known about expectancy effects, the lineup-as-experiment 





lineups have concentrated their efforts on understanding the effects of single-blind 
administration during different stages of the administrator-eyewitness interaction: post-
identification (resulting in confidence malleability) and pre-identification (resulting in decreased 
identification accuracy; for review see Kovera & Evelo 2017). 
Post-identification administrator effects refer to the effect that administrators can have on 
the relationship between a witness’s confidence that their identification was accurate and their 
actual accuracy. Ideally, eyewitnesses’ confidence could serve as a predictor of their accuracy 
(i.e., their confidence and accuracy are calibrated). However, the confidence-accuracy 
correlation varies to a large extent among studies (e.g., Sporer et al., 1995; Wixted et al., 2015) 
pointing to the presence of moderators. One such moderator is confirming feedback that 
witnesses might get after an identification that artificially inflates their confidence regardless of 
accuracy. Confirming feedback from single-blind administrators not only attenuates the 
confidence-accuracy relationship but also affects the witnesses’ meta-cognitions about their 
memory (e.g., time to view the suspect) and the witnesses’ believability at trial (Bradfield et al., 
2002; Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001; Steblay et al., 2014). Calibration tends to increase when 
confidence is collected under pristine conditions, including use of double-blind procedures 
(Wixted & Wells, 2017)    
Pre-identification administrator influence refers to the effects that an administrator can 
have on the witness’s choice from a lineup. Researchers have studied the pre-identification 
administrator influence using three paradigms: the double-blind paradigm, the steering paradigm, 
and the cue-disruption paradigm (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Each paradigm is a variation on the 
standard eyewitness paradigm where mock witnesses watch a mock crime and participate in a 





witness. Researchers manipulate whether the administrator-participants know which lineup photo 
is the suspect (i.e., single-blind) or not (i.e., double-blind) and then observe differences in the 
administrators’ and witnesses’ behavior. In the steering paradigm, confederate researchers serve 
as administrators and follow a script designed to manipulate their behaviors in ways that may 
affect the witnesses’ behaviors. Finally, the cue-disruption paradigm manipulates potential 
barriers that may prevent single-blind administrators from cueing witnesses with regards to 
which lineup member is the suspect. 
The three administrator-influence paradigms and the variables studied in these paradigms 
map onto models of expectancy effect research.  The entire expectancy effect model is presented 
in Figure 1, which displays a simple mediation where the expecter’s expectations affect the 
expecter’s behavior, which affects the target’s behavior or outcome. This model can be applied 
to lineups: the administrator’s knowledge of which lineup member is the suspect affects the 
administrator’s behavior, which affects the witness’s choice. Evidence from the three 
paradigms—which study different aspects of the process—suggests that the expectancy effect 
model is applicable to lineups. The double-blind paradigm examines how administrators transmit 
cues to the; the steering and cue-disruption paradigms focus more on how a witness receives this 
information. The next sections review the literature to provide evidence for the expectancy effect 
model, mainly, that the administrators transmit information and that this information is used by 
witness. This review shows that although some aspects of the model have strong support other 
aspects of the model need further research. 
Effects of Administrator Transmission of Information 
A number of studies use the full-double blind paradigm (e.g., Charman & Quiroz, 2016, 





studies show that an administrator’s knowledge of which lineup member is the suspect causes 
increased identifications of that suspect. This increase in identifications of the suspect occurs 
even when the actual perpetrator is missing, increasing the false identification of innocent 
suspects. However, the size of the effect also shows systematic variance across studies, 
indicating the presence of experiment specific moderators (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). The lineup 
presentation, lineup instructions, and witnesses’ memory all affect the ability of administrators to 
influence the witnesses’ choice. The wide range of potential moderators is troublesome and yet 
no clear theory for potential moderators has emerged. 
The other crucial dependent variable in the double-blind paradigm is the administrators’ 
behavior. In this paradigm, researchers can analyze surreptitiously recorded videos of the lineup 
and record administrator behaviors that may influence the witness. The results indicate that 
single-blind administrators do commit potentially biasing behaviors—such as telling participants 
to examine the lineup carefully, asking the witness to take another look after rejecting the lineup, 
telling the witness that they knew which lineup member is the suspect, smiling at the witness 
after they identify the suspect, and removing pictures that the witness rejected—more than 
double-blind administrators (Charman & Quiroz, 2016; Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). Coders 
(who are blind to condition) can also rate the level of administrator pressure to make a choice or 
administrator pressure choose someone in particular. Compared to double-blind administrators, 
single-blind administrators exert more overall pressure to choose and specific pressure to choose 
the suspect (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Zimmerman et al., 2017). 
Effects of Witness Reception of Information 
It is also clear that witnesses receive and use the information sent by administrators. The first 





al., 2015). The manipulated behaviors have differed in each one. In one study, the behavior was 
manipulated with the intent to induce choosing through ostensible helpful behavior such as 
telling the witness to “take your time” or asking the witness if there “is anyone in the lineup who 
looks more similar to the person you saw than anyone else in the lineup” (Clark et al., 2009). In 
the other studies, administrator behavior was manipulated using a script to change identifications 
of fillers and lineup rejections into identifications of the suspect (Clark et al., 2013; Rhead et al., 
2015). Both types of manipulations increased identifications of the suspect in both culprit-
present and culprit-absent conditions. The second line of evidence comes from cue-disruption 
studies, of which there has only been one. In this study, researchers did not manipulate 
administrator influence but rather tried to constrain it by manipulating the contact that an 
administrator had with the witness (Haw & Fisher, 2004). Administrators were trained to 
conduct a lineup either sitting with the witness (high contact) or by handing the witness the 
lineup materials and sitting out of view during the actual procedure (low contact). In each case, 
the administrator was told who the suspect was and that they should try to get an identification of 
the suspect. In line with hypothesis-leakage and extra-legal information transfer, there were more 
false identifications of an innocent suspect when the administrator had the opportunity to 
influence the witness during sequential lineups (30% in the high contact versus 3% in low 
contact). Although there have only been a few steering and cue-disruption studies, the results 
from these studies clearly show that when administrator behavior sends informational cues to the 
witness and these cues affect witness behavior. 
But what information is transferred? A possibility mentioned by some researchers (e.g., 
Mickes & Gronlund, 2017) is that administrators—through their behavior—give witnesses 





or conservative witnesses should be in choosing from the lineup. Perhaps the administrators’ 
behavior indicates that a suspect is present and that the administrator is highly confident that this 
suspect is the perpetrator. Findings regarding increased choosing from the steering paradigm 
support this conclusion (e.g., Clark et al., 2015).  
However, other studies show that administrator knowledge of which lineup member is 
the suspect influences more than just witness choosing behavior; rather, non-blind administrators 
provide behavioral information about whom to pick—about which photo depicts the suspect. 
There are multiple findings that can only be explained by information cueing. First, a witness’s 
confidence in an identification made from a single-blind lineup depends on whether the witness 
identified the suspect; specifically, witnesses in single-blind lineups who identify the suspect are 
more confident than witnesses in single-blind lineups who identify a filler (Charman & Quiroz, 
2016). This finding makes sense if single-blind administrators are passing along information 
about the suspect’s identity which is then used by the witness to adjust their confidence; 
consistent information causes confidence to go up where inconsistent information causes 
confidence to go down. Additionally, single-blind administrators obtain more identifications of 
the suspect at the cost of identifications of fillers but not lineup rejections, suggesting that 
witnesses are receiving and using information about whom to pick (Charman & Quiroz, 2016; 
Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Most convincingly, witnesses who first 
identify fillers are more likely to switch their initial choice in single-blind lineups and are more 
likely to correctly identify the suspect when they do (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). 
In fact, Evelo and Kovera (2015) modeled the mechanism by which a witness could use 
informational cues from an administrator. The process involved creating a version of WITNESS 





observed in real data (e.g., Goodsell et al., 2010). The model accounted for differences in 
identification decisions made by witnesses in double-blind and single-blind lineups in actual data 
by adding a social parameter which made information about which lineup member was the 
suspect available to the witness and able to affect the simulated decisions. Information transfer 
accounted for these differences without having to modify other memory or decision variables 
such as the strength of the memory in the witness. This modeling exercise also indicated that 
even if information about which lineup member was the suspect was available to the witness, it 
was not always used; even when this information would have been helpful to the simulated 
witnesses (the suspect was not the best match to their memory), they only made use of this 
information about half the time. In other words, witnesses may not be affected by informational 
cues even if they are sent by an administrator.  This situational use of information indicates that 
there are likely moderators explaining under what conditions the witness receives and uses 
informational cues from the administrators.  
 However, few studies have looked at moderators to explain either when administrators 
send information and witness receive it. The goal of the current project is to investigate these 
potential moderators for both the administrator (Cue Transmission Study) and the witness (Cue 
Reception Study). We also test a new framework for moderators, which organizes potential 
moderators using findings from the social psychological literature. 
A Framework for Moderators 
The goal of this project is to extend and apply Rosenthal’s mediation model of 
interpersonal expectancy effects to study the effects of a single-blind administrator’s behavior on 
witnesses’ identification decisions. This new administrator-eyewitness interaction model 





likely affect the decision-making process. Although Rosenthal’s expectancy effect model (1994, 
2002) proposed distal moderators for both the expecter and target, the model did not clearly 
identify where the moderators would change the relationships between other variables in the 
model (see moderator/mediator distinction in Baron & Kenny, 1986). The model also did not 
specify any way to approach or categorize these potential moderators, calling them simply 
“stable attributes of the expecter and the expectee” (Rosenthal, 2002, p. 844).  
Here, we propose that these moderators include characteristics that may affect the 
administrator’s behavior (the transmission of information cues) and the witness’ decision (the 
reception of information cues). We also propose a way to organize these moderators into two 
useful categories borrowed from the psychological literature on attitudes and persuasion. The 
first category are “ability” variables, which effect the capacity to transmit or receive cues; the 
second category are “motivation” variables, which affect the drive to transmit or receive cues.  
The ability versus motivation distinction comes from the psychological literature on 
attitudes and persuasion and focuses on how people assess informational cues. Dual-process 
models of persuasion posit that if individuals have both the ability and motivation to use the 
central (or systematic) route to process information, they will (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & 
Wegener, 1999). If they lack either the motivation or ability to fully process the information, 
they will not process information at all or only process it superficially using peripheral (or 
heuristic) route. In one study, for instance, participants rated a product (a message machine) 
while researchers manipulated the importance of the task (motivation to process), the ambiguity 
of the information (ability to process), and the amount of each information type (strong/central 
versus weak/peripheral information; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). When participants were not 





information. Conversely, participants were able to distinguish and rely on strong informational 
cues only when the task was important and when the information was clear, supporting the 
contention that motivation and ability are necessary for fully processing information.    
Thus, in the administrator-eyewitness interaction model, the ability and motivation of the 
lineup administrator likely affects the sending of information cues; the ability and motivation of 
the witness affects the receipt and use of information cues. An administrator will be less likely to 
send cues if they are unable (e.g., they do not know who the suspect is or they are not in the 
room) or unmotivated (e.g., they have doubts about the suspect’s guilt). Similarly, a witness may 
not use cues if they are unable (e.g., they are distracted and do not notice them) or unmotivated 
(e.g., they are confident in their non-suspect choice). 
Using this ability and motivation distinction would be useful when understanding any 
information transfer model, including the administrator-eyewitness interaction model. Chiefly, it 
adds a simple taxonomy which aids understanding of complex social interactions between two 
people, like a lineup. Additionally, many of the variables studied thus far can naturally be 
categorized as ability or motivation factors. Variables like contact (e.g., Haw & Fisher, 2004) 
and type of lineup (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera, 2009) had effects because they likely affected the 
ability of the administrator to transfer information. The double-blind recommendation itself can 
be seen as a way to control the ability of the administrator to influence the witness. Additionally, 
most studies induce motivation in the administrators or witness (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera, 
2009). Moreover, another study showed large double-blind administration effects by controlling 
for noise inherent in motivation and memory ability (Canter et al., 2013).  
Additionally, the motivation/ability distinction is useful because it highlights new areas 





few have looked at the motivation to send cues. Furthermore, almost none have looked at the 
witness’s ability or motivation to detect cues. If increased witness motivation increases the 
detection and use of information cues—as the administrator-witness interaction model would 
predict—this would be an important finding concerning the external validity of administrator 
expectancy effects. One complaint about this body of research is that administrators and 
witnesses in experimental settings lack the motivation of their real-world counterparts 
(Mecklenburg et al., 2008). However, if witness motivation increases the impact of single-blind 
administrator effects, then this criticism is inappropriate. These effects would be more—not 
less—likely to occur in actual lineups. 
The Current Project 
Given that lineup identifications should be based on the witness’s memory alone, it is 
important to understand what variables affect whether the administrator transmits cues and 
whether the witness receives cues about which lineup member is the suspect. Administrator cues 
about the suspect would constitute extra-legal information. Law enforcement agencies have 
argued that this extra-legal influence does not occur (Mecklenburg et al., 2008) and have been 
loath to adopt this practice in the United States (Greene & Evelo, 2015; Kovera & Evelo, 2017; 
Police Executive Research Forum, 2013; Wise et al., 2011). By manipulating the potential flow 
of information, these studies will examine when and how information transfer is occurring. 
Theoretically, it is also important to understand the full expectancy model and test the usefulness 
of an ability and motivation framework. Recent research has emphasized the importance of 
establishing underlying models for eyewitness memory (e.g., Clark, 2012a; Meissner et al., 
2005). Finally, those not familiar with debates in the eyewitness literature might argue that the 





question whether the double-blind recommendation is needed in practice. Researchers have 
suggested that because single-blind administration increases correct identifications of suspects, 
they might be preferred or at least only rejected on procedural grounds (Mickes & Gronlund, 
2017). A recent review specifically criticized the double-blind recommendation, arguing “more 
data are in the shadows than in the light” (Clark 2012b, p. 282). The current project will address 
these research needs in two studies that investigate the ability and motivation of administrators to 
send information about which lineup member is the suspect (Cue Transmission Study) and 









Chapter 2: Cue Transmission Study, Study 1 
Does the ability and motivation of the administrator affect the sending of information 
cues to a witness? This study tests two sources of motivation when administrators have (single-
blind) or do not have (double-blind) the ability to send information cues. First, we manipulated 
the compensation that administrators received if their witnesses identified the suspect. Second, 
we manipulated the presence of additional evidence—namely, a confession. Manipulating this 
second source of motivation is useful for a few reasons. It has increased ecological validity; other 
sources of evidence are actual sources of motivation for lineup administrators. In addition, 
participants believed that the experimenters are working on a real case and that their decisions 
would have real-world consequences on testimony from an expert witness testifying at the trial. 
In addition, the motivation created by a confession ties into general theories of motivation (e.g., 
Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998) and especially motivation relevant to emerging research on the 
forensic confirmation bias (Kassin et al., 2013; Smalarz et al., 2016) when legal actors are 
motivated to interpret evidence based on their preconceived beliefs. Confessions are a 
particularly powerful source of motivation as people often continue to believe false confessions 
even in the face of fully exonerating evidence (Kassin, 2012).  
Study 1 Hypotheses 
We made a number of hypotheses. The first hypothesis involves administrator behavior, 
the second and third involve the effect on the witness, and the fourth concerns the awareness of 
both individuals. 
Hypothesis 1: Decisions 
The witnesses’ decisions will depend on information cues sent by the administrators 





predicted that ability will moderate the effects of financial motivation and evidentiary motivation 
on the witnesses’ decisions. Witnesses will be more likely to identify the suspect when the 
administrator is single-blind and motivated to send cues than when the administrator is single-
blind but not motivated. When the administrator is double-blind and unable to send cues, 
motivation will have no effect on the witnesses’ decision. A three-way interaction may also 
occur with motivations having a multiplicative effect, rather than additive, in the single-blind 
condition. 
Hypothesis 2: Administrator Behavior 
The administrators’ behaviors will show a similar pattern; administrators will show 
increases in behavior that may suggest which member of the lineup is the suspect when the 
administrators are both motivated and able. Furthermore, the administrators’ behavior will 
mediate the effect of ability on the witnesses’ decisions. Single-blind expectations will increase 
suspect specific behavior which will increase identifications of the suspect.   
Hypothesis 3: Confidence 
In line with other research (Charman & Quiroz, 2016), we predicted that the witnesses’ 
confidence will depend on whether the information cues sent are consistent or inconsistent with 
the witness’s choice. Single-blind informational cues will increase the witnesses’ confidence 
when the witnesses select the suspect but decrease confidence when the witnesses do not select 
the suspect. 
Hypothesis 4: Awareness 
Consistent with past research, we predicted that both witnesses and administrators will 





conditions. However, we also predicted that if awareness does occur, it will be more likely to 
occur in high motivation conditions.  
Study 1 Method 
Design 
 This experiment used a 2 (evidence motivation: no confession versus confession) × 2 
(monetary motivation: no reward versus $25 reward) × 2 (administrator knowledge: double-blind 
versus single-blind) between-subjects design. The unit of analysis are administrator-witness 
dyads. We randomly assigned participants to roles and conditions. 
Participants 
 We recruited 694 participants using two of methods: online personal adverts and in-
person recruitment (see Appendix A). The participants came from both the local urban 
community and the John Jay student population. All participants received $20 for volunteering. 
Students could also earn class credit. 
 A number of participants were excluded from the data set because of a failed suspicion 
check (n = 26), because a participant knew they were being recorded and identified the hidden 
camera (n = 6), because the participant had already participated in this study once (n = 10), or 
because of an experimenter error in failing to deliver the correct protocol (n = 12). These 
exclusions left a final sample of 640 participants. We assigned participants to play the role of 
either a mock witness or mock experimenter. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 71 and were 
skewed to the right (Mdn = 24), reflecting the mix of students and community members. 
Participant frequencies for gender, race, ethnicity, and education are presented in Table 1. 
Participant demographic data did not differ between roles (all ps > .15) and was representative of 






Experimental Room. The laboratory space was a small room containing tables, chairs, 
and storage cabinets. An iMac with a 14-inch screen displayed both the mock crime video and 
the administrator training video. Participants sat approximately 3 feet away from the screen. The 
administrator conducted the lineup on a narrow table. One of the short sides of the table was 
pressed against a wall; the witness and administrator always sat on the long sides of the table 
opposite each other. The participants and lineup were clearly visible from the hidden camera 
when sitting at the table. 
Camera. The room was fitted with a hidden camera to record behavioral data. We used a 
small pinhole camera that was hidden a clock and controllable from an adjacent room. Although 
the clock functioned as clock, this functionality was disabled because it interfered with the 
operation of the camera. The camera was only visible upon a close inspection of the clock. 
Mock Crime Video. Each witness watched one of three mock crimes on video. Each 
video was identical except that the action was performed by a different mock criminal. This 
stimulus sampling was used to increase the probability that any results are not due to specific 
features of the experimental materials. The mock criminals were all college age students, white 
males, with dark eyes and dark hair. Each criminal wore a white t-shirt and jeans. The mock 
criminals came into the room, investigated a bookshelf, and file cabinet, and a backpack, before 
stealing an iPod from the backpack and leaving the room. The videos were about two and a half 
minutes long, with the perpetrators face visible for approximately 45s. The video was shot from 
above, at a distance of about 8 feet, and at a downward angle. 
 Administrator Training Video. Each administrator watched a video on how to conduct 





example simultaneous lineup for a potential witness. In the video, the security officer committed 
three potentially biasing behaviors: adding emphasis when displaying the photo of the suspect, 
asking the witness about the photo of the suspect, and asking the witness to think about the 
perpetrator from a different angle. There was no indication that these behaviors were potentially 
biasing, and participants were told that they could conduct the lineup in any way they saw fit 
whether the behavior was shown in the video or not. The only limitation on potential behaviors 
was that administrators were told that they could not blatantly tell the witness which photo was 
the suspect. 
Lineup. We created a total of three lineups, one for each perpetrator. All lineups were 
simultaneous and perpetrator-absent with a designated innocent suspect. The designated innocent 
suspect was always in a different position. Each photo was a foreword facing headshot of the 
neck and face on a white background. No clothes were visible. The photos were printed in color 
on 4” × 6” glossy photo paper, labeled as Photo #1-6 on the front and back, and placed in an 
envelope. The photos were not connected, allowing the participants to manipulate or move 
individual photos. 
We conducted extensive online pretesting to select the photos and to ensure each lineup 
was fair. For the first phase of pretesting, we obtained similarity ratings for potential fillers and 
designated innocent suspects. The pool of potential fillers consisted of 21 photos used by our 
research group on past occasions matching the general description of our perpetrators. We used 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT; https://www.mturk.com/) to recruit 840 participants. Each 
participant was presented with a photo of the perpetrator from the video and one of the 21 
potential fillers. The participants then rated the similarity of the two photos on a scale from 1 





as the designated innocent suspect. Fillers were randomly selected from the reaming photos with 
the stipulation that their similarity rating be above the median rating for that target and that no 
photo was used in every lineup (see Figure 3) 
The second phase of pretesting ensured that the lineups were fair using the mock witness 
paradigm, which has predictive validity (Malpass et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2020). Using AMT, we 
recruited 198 participants and—after giving them a description of the suspect—asked them to 
guess which photo depicted the suspect. The lineup fairness results are in Table 2, with 
functional sizes greater than 7.33, effective sizes greater than 3.91, and Tredoux’s E values 
greater than 3.51. The numbers indicate that—a priori—the lineups were generally fair, that no 
one stood out, and there were multiple good choices. The same statistics for the resultant lineups 
are presented in Table 3 (see Quigley-McBride & Wells, 2020). These figures, calculated from 
the actual lineup results from the unbiased conditions, indicate that there was a decrease in lineup 
fairness moving from the mock witness paradigm to the actual study, which was most 
pronounced in one of the lineups. 
 Lineup Identification Form. All administrators were given a one-sided lineup 
identification form. The first half asked the administrator to check a box to indicate which photo, 
if any, the witness chose. There were 7 choices: 6 labeled with photo numbers and 1 labeled 
“The witness did not identify any photo.” The second half of the identification form dealt with 
confidence that the witness had made the correct decision (regardless of whether they identified a 
photo or not). First, the instructions told the administrator to obtain the confidence of the witness 
in the witness’s own words; second, the instructions told the administrator to obtain the 





confident). There was space after each instruction for the administrator to write the witness’s 
response.  
 Filler Task. Between watching the mock crime video and the lineup, witnesses 
completed a filler task. This task consisted of two word-search puzzles (see Appendix B). Each 
one was printed on a separate page and the two pages were stapled together. Each word search 
contained 43 words, which could be hidden in any direction.  
Participant Questionnaires. Both administrator and witness participants received a post-
lineup questionnaire, which was modified from past research (e.g., Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). 
The administrators’ version (see Appendix C) included an administrator bias survey of six 
statements pertaining to the potential bias administrators thought they exerted during the lineup 
experience (e.g., “I was fair and impartial throughout the lineup.”). The administrator-
participants rated these statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
The items showed acceptable reliability (α = .69) and were averaged to form a scale where 
higher scores (after reverse coding of three items) more bias in the lineup as rated by the 
administrator themselves. 
The witnesses’ version of the post-lineup questionnaire (see Appendix D) measured both 
perceived bias and meta-cognitions about their memory of the staged crime. The witness bias 
survey includes six items similar to the administrators’ items but reworded to measure the 
witnesses’ perceptions of the administrators’ potentially biasing behavior (e.g., “The 
administrator of this lineup was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration.”) The 
witness rated these items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The items 
showed acceptable reliability (α = .73) and were averaged to create a scale score where higher 





also respond to a witness memory survey—nine items about their meta-cognitions for the 
witnessed event (e.g., “During the video I had a good view of the perpetrator”, “I felt it was easy 
to make an identification”), which the witnesses rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly disagree). The items showed good reliability (α = .85) and were average to create scale 
scores where higher scores indicated more trust in cognition. Also related to meta-cognitions, the 
witnesses answered two open ended items: a) “During the video, how far away was the 
perpetrator from the camera” and b) “During the video, how long was the perpetrator’s face in 
your view.” Finally, witnesses answered whether they thought the administrator knew which 
member of the lineup was the suspect. 
Both versions of the questionnaire also collected demographic information (see Appendix 
C & D). The demographic survey included four items regarding age, gender, race/ethnicity, and 
education. 
Procedure 
 Participants arrived at our laboratory separately, two at a time. A research assistant (RA) 
greeted the participants and took them into the experimental room (script in Appendix E). After 
obtaining informed consent (see Appendix F), the RA asked the participants to draw numbers 
from a bowl. The participant-witness stayed in the room while the RA took the participant-
administrator to a desk that was a short distance down the hall. The RA told the administrator 
that they could do the filler task while they waited. The RA returned to the experimental room 
where the witness was waiting. The RA told the witness that the task was to watch a short video 
and to pay attention because they would be asked questions about it later. The RA then played 
the mock crime video. When the video was done, the RA informed the witness that they had just 





short time they would try to identify the culprit from a lineup conducted by the participant 
administrator. The RA also asked the witness not to discuss what was on the video with the other 
participant. 
 Administrator training occurred next. The RA took the witness down the hall so that the 
witness and the administrator could switch places. Before returning to the experimental room 
with the administrator, the RA asked the witness to complete the filler task at the desk, and 
specifically mentioned that the researchers were interested in how many words the witness could 
find in the word-search. Once back in the experimental room, the RA told the administrator that 
the researchers were consulting with the Manhattan District Attorney on a criminal case, that the 
other participant had just witnessed a crime caught on security footage, and that it would be the 
administrator’s job to conduct a six-person photo lineup. The RA led the administrator to believe 
that this was a real case and that the results would help inform expert opinion and sworn 
testimony about the case. The RA told the administrator that there was a real suspect in custody 
and that they should try and get the witness to identify this suspect. Every administrator was told 
that the suspect was charged with robbery, burglary, and assault; in the confession motivation 
condition, the administrator was also told that the suspect had confessed to these crimes. 
 At this point, the training began regarding how to conduct the lineup. The RA first 
showed the administrator the administrator training video. After the video was over, the RA sat 
at the desk with the administrator to go over the lineup itself. The RA demonstrated how to 
remove the photos, display the photos for the witness, mark the identification form, and gather 
confidence ratings. The final manipulations came during these instructions. For single-blind 
lineups, the RA told the administrator which photo was of the suspect; for double-blind lineups, 





photo. In the motivation condition, the administrators were told that they would earn an extra 
$25-dollar reward (i.e., in addition to their $20 compensation) if the witness identified the 
suspect; administrators in the unmotivated condition were not offered any extra compensation. 
 After answering any questions, the RA left the administrator in the experimental room 
and went to the witness in the hallway waiting area. The RA collected the crossword and 
informed the witness that the lineup—conducted by the other participant—was about to begin. 
The RA then read the lineup instructions that included a change of appearance instruction (to 
induce choosing) and instructions that the culprit may or may not be present. Furthermore, the 
RA informed the witness that there is a suspect but that the administrator either does (single-
blind) or does not (double-blind) know which photo depicts the suspect (see also Dysart et al., 
2012). 
 After answering any remaining questions, the RA brought the witness into the 
experimental room to join the administrator. The RA informed both the witness and the 
administrator that she would be outside and to please let her know when the lineup was 
complete. The RA then closed the door behind her and remained in the hallway for the remainder 
of the lineup. When the participants indicated they were finished, the RA reentered the room and 
made sure the identification form was complete. If it was not complete, she redirected the 
administrator to complete the form and left the room again. Once the identification form was 
complete, the RA handed the administrator and the witness their respective questionnaires. The 
RA then separated the two, allowing the witness to complete the forms alone in the experimental 
room and allowing the administrator to complete the forms alone in the hallway waiting area. 
 When the participants had finished their forms, the research manager—who was 





experimental room to do a joint debrief. The research manager probed for suspicion of the 
manipulated variables and knowledge of the secret camera. The research manager then informed 
both participants about the goal of the experiment and the manipulations. The research manager 
revealed the deception regarding the nature of the case and materials, and the administrator was 
assured that this data was not to be used in a real case. Both participants were told about the 
hidden camera and the reason for surreptitious video recording. The research manager gave the 
participants three choices regarding the use of the videos: delete the video, give consent for it to 
be used in this research, or give consent for it to be used in this research, future research, data 
repositories, and future research. The participants signed a consent form indicating their choice 
(see Appendix G). Videos were only kept, used, and uploaded to the Open Science Framework if 
both participants gave the appropriate level of consent. Finally, the research manager 
compensated the participants and gave the reward to the administrator if applicable. 
Study 1 Results 
 We present an analysis of the results in the order of the expectancy process. First, we 
present an analysis of the manipulation checks and the video coding procedures. Second, we 
present an analysis of the administrators’ behaviors: ratings of applied pressure, enumerated 
administrator behaviors, and administrator survey ratings. Third and finally we present an 
analysis of the witnesses’ behaviors: witness choice, witness confidence, witness survey ratings, 
witness switching behavior. Cohen’s d is presented for tests between means and partial eta-
squared is presented for higher order effects. Missing data is deleted pairwise. 
Manipulation Check 
 Administrators were asked two critical manipulation check questions regarding the 





these questions incorrectly: 37 failed the confession check, 24 failed the reward check, and 8 
failed both. This left 251 dyads for comparison. 
Videos and Coding Reliability  
 Of the 251 remaining videos, only 228 could be analyzed. 17 were deleted during post-
hoc video informed consent by the participant. Six were removed because of technically 
difficulties including un-synced sound or failure to record the entire lineup. 
Two coders watched the lineup videos and coded a number of variables related to the 
length and pressure of the lineup (see Appendix H). The coders showed good reliability overall. 
There was high agreement on when the lineup started, r(226) = .93¸ p < .01, and when the lineup 
ended, r(224) = .84, p < .01. There was also agreement on the amount of overall pressure in a 
lineup, r(209) = .45, p < .01. Finally, the coders tended to agree on the pressure toward the 
suspect regardless of position in the lineup: Position 3, r(74) = .58, p < 01; Position 4, r(76) = 
.39, p < .01; Position 5, r(66) = .37, p < .01. Coders had poor agreement (average r = .11, min r = 
-.15, max r = .64) when rating pressure toward or away from fillers. 
Coders also indicated the presence of absence of 24 administrator behaviors and 2 
witness behaviors. We calculated a Cohen’s Kappa for each behavior. Three behaviors did not 
have a significant level of agreement—adding emphasis, showing pleasure, and showing 
displeasure—and were removed from further analysis. A fourth behavior—administrators 
mentioning that the suspect confessed—was also removed because no coder indicated that it 
occurred. The remaining variables showed acceptable reliability, with an average Kappa of .46 
and ranging from a minimum of .17 to a maximum of .80. A third coder reconciled any 






 Ratings of Applied Pressure. Two coders rated each video on the overall pressure to 
choose a photo on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). We averaged these scores across 
each coder and attempted to predict these values from an ANOVA of the full model. The only 
significant effect was a main effect of financial motivation, F(1, 203) = 16.28, p < .01, η2 = .07 . 
Average pressure was rated as higher when administrators were offered a reward (M = 2.50, SD 
= 0.92) compared to no reward (M = 2.00, SD = 0.81). The higher amount of pressure used by 
nonblind administrators was also reflected in an increase in the time lineup took. We averaged 
each coder’s estimate of the lineup start and end times. We used this score to create a lineup 
length variable, measured in seconds. Due to a right skew in the overall time variable for each 
line, we tested for non-parametric main effects using three Mann-Whitney U tests. The only 
significant effect was for financial motivation, U = 4930.00, Z = -2.87, p < .01. Lineups were 
shorter when no reward was offered (Mdn = 100.0, IQR = 67.5) and longer when a reward was 
offered (Mdn = 135.0, IQR = 116.0). 
 Contrary to our hypothesis, there was no clear evidence that this pressure was applied 
more to the suspect in single-blind lineups. To test this hypothesis, we created a binary 
variable—based on suspect specific pressure ratings averaged across coders—to indicate whether 
the suspect received the most pressure out of any other photo. The suspect received the most 
pressure in only 17(7%) of the 251 lineup videos. This low cell count made it impossible to 
interpret higher order interactions between the variables using a binary logistic regression. 
Because of this, the main effects here should be interpreted with caution—that is, it may be given 
more power that these main effects would be qualified or better explained by a higher order 
interaction. However, we present the data here, because they may help explain the overall lack of 





motivation, β(1) = 1.10, p = .046, OR = 3.02, and marginally significant effect of administrator 
knowledge, β(1) = 1.01, p = .089, OR = 2.75. The odds ratio here indicates that the suspect was 
more likely to receive the most pressure when the administrator was offered a reward, and 
separately when the administrator knew which member of the lineup was the suspect. 
 The effect of reward motivation carried over into the ability of the coders to guess which 
photo was the suspect. We created a continuous variable representing the number of coders who 
guessed the suspect which ranged from zero to two. Using a full model ANOVA to predict the 
number of coders who guessed the suspect, we found a significant main effect of financial 
motivation, F(1, 243) = 4.93, p = .03, η2 = .20. More coders were able to correctly guess the 
suspect when the administrator had been offered a reward (M = 0.40, SD = 0.69) than when the 
administrator had not been offered a reward (M = 0.23, SD = 0.54).   
 Enumerated Administrator Behaviors. To analyze the actual behaviors displayed by 
the administrators, we first created a total behavior variable by summing across the 20 reliable 
coding categories (see Table 4). This summation resulted in a variable—potential ranging from 0 
to 20—with higher scores indicating that the administrator engaged in more potential biasing 
behaviors at least once. The actual total behavior variable had a mean of 3.5 (SD = 2.4) and 
ranged from zero to 12, with some slight right skewness. A full model ANOVA revealed only a 
main effect of financial motivation, F(1, 220) = 11. 04, p < .01, η2 = .05. Administrators offered 
a reward exhibited more potential biasing behaviors (M = 4.06, SD = 2.55) than did 
administrators who were not offered a reward (M = 2.96, SD = 2.16). There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions. 
 We also completed a planned comparison between single-blind and double-blind 





first was that administrators in single blind lineups (n = 1) were less likely than administrators in 
double-blind lineups (n = 7) to say that they did not know which photo was of the suspect. The 
second was that, out of 17 administrators who stated “you seem to be looking at this photo a long 
time”, administrators in single-blind lineups tended to say this significantly more often (n = 13) 
than did administrators in double-blind lineup (n = 4), χ2(1) = 3.893, p = .048, φ = .13.  
Finally, we analyzed whether behaviors were differentially targeting the suspect. Item 6-
15 were all administrator behaviors which could be targeted at a specific photo (see Table 5). 
This made it possible to analyze whether the single-blind administrators were more likely to 
target suspects, fillers, or both. However, there were no significant differences between single-
blind and double-blind administrators in the types of photos that they targeted (see Table 5).   
 Administrator Survey. After the lineup, administrators filled out a survey about whether 
they thought they had biased or tainted the lineup procedure. Scores were averaged across six 
items after reverse coding so that higher scores indicated more perceived bias. The scores ranged 
from 1 to 5, with a mean of 2.22 (SD = 0.84), indicating the most administrators did not think 
they biased the lineup. An ANOVA found no significant main effects or interactions when 
predicting the average bias score from the full model. 
Witness Behavior 
 Witness Choice. Out of 251 lineups, witnesses identified the suspect 47 times (19%), 
identified a filler 167 times (67%), and rejected the lineup 37 times (15%). Given that all lineups 
were target absent, this means that 15% of witnesses made the correct choice.   
The witnesses’ choices are broken down by all independent variables in Table 6. We used 
the full model to predict binary classifications of the witnesses’ decisions: suspect versus non-





interaction, and the three-way interaction separately in individual blocks. Contrary to our 
hypotheses, there were no significant effects at any stage for any of the three decision models.  
 Witness Confidence. Considering the information cue model of lineup influence, the 
effect of administrator knowledge on confidence should depend on whether that information is 
consistent with the choice of the witness. Single-blind administrators should increase the 
confidence of witnesses who choose the suspect because they will communicate information that 
the witness made the right choice; single-blind administrators should decrease the confidence of 
witnesses who choose a filler because the administrator will communicate information that the 
witness made the wrong choice. 
 To test this hypothesis, we ran an ANOVA to predict confidence from witness choice and 
administrator knowledge. Contrary to our hypotheses there was no interaction, F(1, 244) = 0.01, 
p = .93, η2 < .01. There were also no main effect of either administrator knowledge, F(1, 244) = 
1.61, p = .21, η2 < .01, or suspect identification, F(1, 244) = 0.38, p = .54, η2 < .01. An ANOVA 
including both confidence variables produced similar results; there were no significant 
interactions involving both suspect choice and administrator knowledge. 
 Witness Survey Ratings. Witness ratings showed a consistent pattern of non-significant 
results. We used the full model ANOVA to predict the witness meta-cognition average scale 
score, the witness perceived lineup bias average scale score, the witnesses’ estimations of 
distance to the perpetrator, and the witnesses’ estimations of the time the perpetrator was visible. 
There were no significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .09). 
 Witness Switching Behavior. Coders indicated that only 25 witnesses changed their 





binary logistic regression. The variables in the full model were unable to predict witness 
switching behavior for either choice or confidence (all ps > .31) 
Study 1 Discussion 
 We found no support for our hypotheses in this study. Primarily, administrator 
knowledge did not interact with motivation when it was manipulated through a reward nor when 
it was manipulated through the presence of a confession. There was also no main effect of 
administrator knowledge. Without differential behavior in the administrator, it is somewhat not 
surprising that there was no differential behavior in the witnesses, either in what the witnesses 
chose or the witnesses’ confidence in that choice. 
 The lack of administrator knowledge effects in this study is surprising, given the effects 
found throughout the literature (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). One possible explanation is that the 
majority of administrators were hypermotivated to get an identification. Administrators might 
behave this way because of the motivation conditions, or some other aspect of the study, such as 
the apparent “real case” or the wording of the administrator condition. If this were the case, 
administrators in both single- and double-blind lineups may have put pressure on the witness to 
pick someone rather than reject the lineup. The most consistent finding was in fact that 
administrators offered a reward seemed to put a great deal of pressure on their witnesses to pick 
someone. This finding may have been the result of a lottery type mentality (e.g., “you can’t win 
if you don’t play”) with blind administrators putting pressure on witnesses to not reject the 
lineup whereas nonblind administrators put pressure on the witness to not reject the lineup and to 
pick the suspect. Due to the reward, nonblind administrators—unlike real detectives or witness 
participants in other studies—may have preferred filler identifications to rejections. If all 





much variance left for administrator blindness to produce the traditional filler-to-suspect shift. 
Evidence for this explanation exists in the overall high amount of lineup identifications (85%) 
versus rejections (15%), especially considering that all lineups were culprit-absent. 
 Another possible explanation, is that some administrators were under—not over—
motivated. Past studies (e.g., Zimmerman et al., 2017) have offered some form of base 
motivation to administrators to help simulate real law enforcement administrators—individuals 
who are motivated to get identifications of the suspect. Administrators randomly assigned to 
single-blind lineups and no reward manipulation were probably not sufficiently motivated to 
send any cues, which may have eliminated any effect of administrator knowledge. In hindsight, 
an improvement to the design would have offered a reward to all participants to get an 
identification of the suspect and to manipulate the size of this reward between low and high 
motivation conditions. 
 A final possible explanation for the lack of administrator knowledge effects may be that 
witnesses were not motivated to use the cues sent by administrators. In this study, and unlike past 
studies (e.g., Zimmerman et al., 2017), both participants were randomly assigned to condition 
together. Because the random assignment occurred in the same room, witness participants were 
aware that the administrator was not a lab member and that the administrator was untrained. This 
knowledge may have diminished the administrators’ authority in the eyes of the witnesses and 
made their influence less effectual. 
 We do see a hint of administrator effects in the fact that administrators offered reward 
motivation were more likely to put suspect specific pressure on the witness as well. Given the 
experimental control, this finding does not make sense unless there is also an effect of 





suspect specific pressure was also the only variable to even show a marginal effect of 
administrator knowledge. This finding suggests another possible explanation for the lack of 
replication in this study: low power. The a priori power analyses indicated that 280 participants 
should be sufficient to detect the given effects if present. We added a 40 dyad cushion to protect 
this number from missing data. This cushion however was not sufficient; the sample sized was 
significantly lowered after removing 69 dyads due to the failure of the manipulation check and 
17 more videos due to informed consent and technical difficulties. We addressed this issue 
specifically in Study 2 by making sure each participant passed the manipulation check before 
counting them toward the total. 
 We incorporated this last lesson specifically into the next study. The critical manipulation 
checks were performed while the study was ongoing. This practice allowed the research staff to 







Chapter 3: Cue Reception Study, Study 2 
Does the ability and motivation of the witness affect how much information is received 
and used during lineups? Study 2 transitions from looking at administrator factors to witness 
factors (e.g., can the effect of administrator influence be increased or decreased with motivation 
and ability variables). Here, we used a steering eyewitness paradigm to ensure that half of the 
administrators were attempting to influence the witnesses to choose the suspect. We then 
attempted to increase witnesses’ motivation to use this information provided by the administrator 
by offering them a reward to identify the suspect ($25 versus $0) or to decrease their ability to 
use this information by manipulating cognitive load (high versus low).  
Study 2 Hypotheses 
 We posit two hypotheses. The first regards the witnesses’ decisions; the second regards 
the witnesses’ confidence. 
Hypothesis 1: Decisions 
Participant witnesses will be more likely to detect and use information from the 
administrator when they are motivated and able. Specifically, we predict a three-way interaction 
between administrator steering, witness ability, and witness motivation. The witnesses’ ability 
should moderate the interaction between the witnesses’ motivation and administrators’ steering. 
When the witnesses’ ability to pick up on informational cues is low (due to high cognitive load) 
there will be no interaction between steering and motivation on the number of identifications of 
the suspect. However, when the witness has the ability to pick up on informational cues (due to 
high cognitive load) there will be an interaction between steering and motivation. The witnesses’ 
motivation to pick the suspect should have no effect when there is no steering—and therefore no 





if the administrators are steering and the witnesses are motivated (versus not motivated) to detect 
and use the cues. 
Hypothesis 2: Confidence 
We predict that the witnesses’ confidence will depend on the administrators steering and 
the witnesses’ choice. Single-blind informational cues will increase the witnesses’ confidence 
when the witnesses select the suspect but decrease confidence when the witnesses do not select 
the suspect. 
Study 2 Method 
Design 
 This experiment used a 2 (witness ability: high cognitive load versus low cognitive load) 
× 2 (witness motivation: no reward versus $25 reward) × 2 (steering: no steering versus steering) 
between-subjects design. We randomly assigned participants to roles and conditions. 
Participants  
We recruited 317 participants from online personal advertisements (see Appendix A). All 
participants received at least $20 for participating.  
A number of participants were excluded for failing the manipulation check in different 
ways. The critical manipulation check question asked whether the participants noticed the 
financial motivation manipulation. We excluded three participants who left this item blank, 11 
participants who incorrectly indicated that they were not offered money, five participants who 
were unable to specify the correct amount they were offered, and one participant who incorrectly 
said they were offered compensation. We did not exclude two participants in the no witness 
motivation condition who incorrectly indicated that they were offered a $20 reward—likely 





In total, 20 participants failed the manipulation check. We removed another four 
participants for failing the suspicion checks and another 14 participants because there was an 
experimenter error when delivering the assigned protocol. After these eliminations, there were 
279 participants available for analysis. All data exclusions were determined before the primary 
analyses were conducted.  
 The remaining participants reflected the demographics of the local area. The average 
participant age was 38.76 (SD = 14.26, min = 18, max = 79). One hundred thirty-two participants 
identified as female, 145 identified as male, and one identified as transgender. The racial makeup 
was diverse (Asian = 12%, Black or African American = 32%, Hispanic, Latino, or Latina = 
13%. White = 33%, Other/Mixed = 10%). Thirty-three percent of participants reported having 
earned a high school degree or less; 67% of participants reported having a college degree or 
higher. 
Materials 
 For the Study 2, we used the same experimental room, camera, mock crime videos, 
lineup identification form, and filler task as were used in Study 1. The lineup and the witness 
survey were modified to make them appropriate for this study. Finally, we added an audio 
distraction task that served as the cognitive load manipulation. These new and modified materials 
are explained below. 
 Lineup. The same photos were used for the lineups, and all three remained culprit-
absent. For this study, the designated innocent suspect was placed in Position 2. This change was 
done to facilitate steering and limit confusion among RAs when stimulus sampling. The photos 
were printed on similar 4” × 6” glossy photo paper and remained loose, stored in an envelope. 





Participant Questionnaires. The witnesses received a post-lineup questionnaire similar 
to that used in Study 1 (see Appendix I). Participants completed the same 6-item witness bias 
survey (α = .84) and the same 9-item witness memory survey (α = .84). Scale scores were 
calculated for the witness bias survey and the witness memory survey by averaging across items 
so that higher scores indicated more bias and better ratings of memory, respectively. The 
questionaries’ also contained the two open ended items about viewing time (“During the video, 
how long was the perpetrator’s face in your view”) and viewing distance (“During the video, 
how far away was the perpetrator from the camera.”) 
After these questionnaires were a number of manipulation check questions between the 
viewing conditions questions and the demographic survey. We asked three yes/no questions 
regarding whether they thought the administrator knew which photo was the suspect, whether 
they were told the importance of the task, and whether they were offered additional money for 
identifying the suspect. We also asked the participants to rate the difficulty of the task and their 
motivation to complete the task on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all difficult/motivated) to 
6 (extremely difficult/motivated). The only manipulation check that was critical was the question 
about compensation.  
The participant questionnaires ended with the same demographic questions asked in 
Study 1. This demographic survey is located in Appendix I. 
 Audio Distraction Task. Finally, we created an audio distraction task to manipulate 
cognitive load. During the audio task, participants listened to a series of tones on an audio track. 
The tones were all the sinusoidal tones of the same pitch and volume, similar to a hearing test. 
The tones sounded at varying intervals with only one tone sounding at a time, followed by a rest 





by a small portable music device. Participants listened to the audio track using “ear-bud” type 
disposable headphones provided by the researchers. 
 We manipulated cognitive load during the task by varying the complexity of each track. 
For low cognitive load, we created the simple track. The simple track had only six tones per 
minute. The tones were randomly placed within each minute so there was no discernable pattern. 
For high cognitive, we create the complex track. The complex track had 12 tones per minute. 
These were again randomly placed within each minute. To increase distraction, the track also 
contained background static, making the tones harder to hear and any instructions harder to hear. 
In addition to this distraction, we also increased cognitive load by asking participants to count 
the number of tones during the complex task. Pretesting was used to ensure the complex track 
created a more difficult task than the simple track, and that participants could still perform other 
duties (i.e., a lineup) while listening to the tracks. 
 Both the simple and complex track were 30 minutes long to ensure no participant ever 
reached the end. Both tracks also started with a male voice saying, “This is an official trial, 
beginning in three, two, one.” The instructions were included to help the experimenters check the 
volume and to make sure that the participants heard the first tone.  
 We also created a practice track. The RAs used this track to acquaint the participants 
with the task, to make sure the headphones were working, and to adjust the volume if needed. 
This track was 60 seconds long. It included four tones and no static. The track played after a 
male voice said, “This is a practice trial, beginning in three, two, one.” All participants heard the 






A script of the procedure is presented in Appendix J. The protocol involved three 
different roles played by the research staff. The research assistant (RA) was either a male or 
female undergraduate student in charge of guiding the participants through the protocol. The 
lineup administrator was female graduate or undergraduate student who—after extensive 
training—conducted the lineups. The research manager was a male or female graduate student in 
charge of supervising the study, ensuring the staff followed the protocol, and debriefing the 
participants.  
 Where possible, research staff was blind. RAs were blind to the steering condition and 
the hypothesis of the study. Lineup administrators were blind to the motivation condition, the 
cognitive load condition, the fact that no lineups contained the perpetrator, and the hypothesis of 
the study. The research managers were not blind to any information and therefore only interacted 
with the participants after the measures were collected. 
Setup Phase. The RA greeted participants as they arrived to the lab and took the 
participant into the experimental room. After obtaining informed consent (see Appendix K), the 
RA played the mock crime video for the participant. After the video was over, the RA informed 
the participant that they had just witnessed a crime and that the researchers were interested in the 
participant’s memory for the culprit. The RA also informed the participant that—in addition to 
the lineup—they would need to complete three ostensible “memory and attention” tasks, to 
measure their underlying cognitive ability. These tasks served as a cover story for different 
aspects of the experiment. 
 A word-search puzzle was the first memory and attention task. Like in Study 1, the word-
search consisted of two puzzles on two pages, stapled. The RA first gave the participant the 





researchers were interested in the number of words that the participant could find in five minutes. 
The word-search was actually a filler task to ensure that the participant did not rehearse the 
perpetrator’s face during the time between watching the crime video and the lineup 
administration. The RA instructed the participant to begin the word-search and—at the same 
time—flipped over a five-minute sand-timer, visible to the participant. When the timer was 
finished, the RA instructed the participant to stop and then collected the word-search. 
 The audio task was the second memory and attention task and took place at the same time 
as the lineup. In a short instruction session (approx. 5 min), the RA gave a series of instructions 
about completing these tasks at the same time, including that a different individual (i.e., the 
lineup administrator) would conduct the lineup after the RA left the room, that the lineup 
administrator had a suspect in the crime, and that the lineup administrator was interested in 
whether the participant could identify that suspect. The RA also gave the participant headphones, 
completed the practice track, and made sure that the participant could hear both the tones and 
any further instructions. The music device was set to a preferred volume and only adjusted up as 
needed.  
 During this information and practice session, the RA also delivered the motivation and 
cognitive load manipulations. In the reward motivation condition, the RA informed the 
participant that they would get an additional $25 if they identified the suspect (RA training and 
monitoring ensured that the word suspect was used, and not culprit). No extra instructions were 
given in the no-reward motivation condition. In the low cognitive load condition, the RA told the 
participant to simply to listen to the tones play while the lineup took place. In the high cognitive 
load condition, the RA told the participant to keep track of how many tones they heard, and to be 





appropriate simple or complex track for participants in the low or high cognitive load conditions 
respectively. 
 After the RA was finished with the instruction and practice session, there was a short 
question opportunity to make sure that the participant understood the lineup and audio tone task. 
If the participant had no questions or when the RA had answered all questions, the RA began the 
track and left the room. 
 Lineup Phase. Approximately 10 to 30 seconds after the RA left the room, the lineup 
administrator would enter, introduce themselves, and read a short set of instructions before 
beginning the lineup. The instructions included wording that the culprit may not be present. The 
instructions also included appearance change instructions intended to lower criterion and 
increase choosing. Finally, the instructions included a warning that the administrator would 
obtain their confidence regardless of their decision, per new recommended best practices (Wells 
et al., 2020). If the participant took off the earphones during these instructions or during the 
lineup, the lineup administrator politely told the participant to put the headphones back on and 
keep them on for the remainder of the lineup. 
 The administrator then began the lineup. In the no-steering condition, the administrator 
laid out all six photos, remained still, and did not speak until the participant made a choice. The 
administrator then wrote down that choice, obtained the confidence rating, removed the photos, 
and left the room. In the rare instance that the participant did not make a decision—usually 
because they were busy counting tones or did not know that they should vocalize the choice—the 
administrator would remain still and unspeaking for approximately 10 minutes. After an 
estimated ten minutes had elapsed, the administrator would then prompt the participant as to 





prompting solved any confusion and the lineup would end with the participant voicing a 
decision. 
 In the steering condition, the lineup administrator followed a script (see Appendix L). 
The script itself involved a number of behaviors and interrogation tools designed to get the 
participant to realize that the suspect was in Position 2 and to pick that photo. First, the script 
contained a number of behaviors that the administrator always did in relation to Photo 2. 
Whenever the administrator touched Photo 2, she tapped it twice. Furthermore, when the 
participant mentioned Photo 2, the administrator would look happy, nod, and ostensibly write 
down notes about what the participant was saying on the identification form. The administrator 
would look unhappy, use vocal hedges (e.g., an elongated “…okay…”), and not write down any 
notes when talking about other photos.  
 If the participant picked Photo 2, the steering administrator would congratulate the 
participant on a good job and get the participant’s confidence. If the participant did not choose 
Photo 2, or had not chosen anyone after 10 seconds, the participant would switch to using three 
interrogation tools—tools designed to try to get the participant to talk about, and then pick Photo 
2. The three tools in the interrogation toolbox included “Prodding”, “Elimination”, and “Suggest 
Alternatives.” During prodding, the administrator would ask general but leading questions (e.g., 
“Is there anyone who looks most like the culprit?”). During elimination, the administrator would 
remove fillers if the participant indicated the filler was not the culprit or requested the photos to 
be removed. The administrator would never remove Photo 2 and would not return fillers once 
eliminated. Finally, during suggest alternatives, the administrator would ask the participant to 





 The administrator was encouraged to use these tools in any order that seemed 
appropriate, with any of multiple suggested interrogation questions. If an interrogation tool got 
the participant talking about Photo 2, the administrator would then attempt to push the 
participant to make that decision and secure an ID of the suspect. If a tool did not work, the 
administrator would switch to another tool. Administrators could use a tool as many times as 
they saw fit given the progression of the lineup, but they were required to use all three at least 
once before ending the lineup. If it appeared that an ID of Photo 2 was unlikely, the 
administrator attempted to obtain a lineup rejection instead of an ID of a filler. This aspect of the 
script simulated a law enforcement officer attempting to preserve a witness for future lineups. 
Once the administrator had used all three tools at least once, the administrator could allow a 
lineup rejection or filler identification only after showing displeasure at the participant’s choice 
and providing three prompts to get the participant to consider the lineup again (e.g., “Okay, are 
you sure? Why don’t you look again?”). The administrator would then clean up the photos and 
leave the room. 
 Final Phase.  After the lineup was complete, the RA would reenter the room and stop the 
audio task. In the high cognitive load condition, the RA would ask the participant to report the 
number of tones they heard. In the low cognitive load condition, the RA would ask the 
participant to guess how many tones they heard. The RA would then record both the amount of 
time the track played and the number of tones reported. 
 The RA then explained that the third and final memory and attention task was a survey 
about what the participant experienced. The RA then gave the participant the witness survey and 





 When the participant had completed the survey, the research manager entered the room 
and began the debriefing. The research manager probed for suspicion and then explained the 
nature of the study. The research manager also explained the necessity of surreptitious video 
recording and obtained consent to use the video, or the research manager deleted the video per 
the participants’ instructions (See Appendix M). Finally, the research manager paid the 
participant—including any applicable rewards—and ended the study. 
Study 2 Results 
 We present, in order, an analysis of the video and coding reliability, the manipulation 
checks, witness decisions, witness confidence, and witness perceptions. Cohen’s d is presented 
for tests between means and partial eta-squared is presented for higher-order effects. Missing 
data is deleted pairwise. 
Videos and Coding Reliability 
 Of the 279 videos, only 254 were analyzed. Nineteen were deleted at the request of the 
participant and six were removed for technically difficulties. 
 Two separate blind coders rated each of the videos using a simplified coding sheet (see 
Appendix N). The coders timed the lineup and rated the overall pressure applied by the steering 
or non-steering behavior. These relatively easy tasks showed good reliability; there was a high 
degree agreement about the length of the lineup, r(247) = .995  ̧p < .01, and the pressure applied 
by the administrator, r(252) = .974  ̧p < .01. These continuous variables were averaged for 
analysis. 
 The coders also rated two aspects of the witnesses’ behavior; whether the witnesses 
changed their lineup decision or the witnesses’ changed their confidence. The ratings of the 





= .89, p < .01, the original choice that witness made, κ(38) = .88, p < .01, and the final choice 
that the witness made, κ(38) = 1.00, p < .01. However, changes to confidence were made 
rarely—with all coders indicating fewer than eight occurrences—and with little, but statistically 
significant, agreement as to when, κ(252) = .39, p < .01. A third blind coder reconciled 
disagreements regarding changes to both decisions and confidence levels. 
Manipulation Check 
 The critical and a priori manipulation check was only in regard to whether participants 
correctly noticed the reward. Details about the removal of the data from participants who 
provided incorrect responses are noted in the participant section. The remaining participants 
reported a significant difference in motivation to identify the suspect, t(276) = 4.42, p < .01, d = 
0.53, 95% CI [.29, .77]. As, expected, participants who were offered a reward reported that they 
were more motivated to identify the suspect (M = 4.17, SD = 0.75) than did participants who 
were not offered the reward (M = 3.69, SD = 1.04), although both group averages are above the 
midpoint on the scale. 
 The audio tone task was also effective. There was a significant difference between 
cognitive load conditions on task difficulty, t(277) = 10.66, p < .01, d = 1.28, 95% CI [1.02, 
1.53], with participants rating the task as more difficult in the high cognitive load condition (M = 
2.98, SD = 1.12) than in the low cognitive load condition (M = 1.68, SD = 0.91). There is also 
evidence that—despite differences in difficulty—participants in both conditions appropriately 
attended to the audio task. As expected, participants reported more tones in the high cognitive 
load condition (M = 57.67, SD = 34.86) than in the low cognitive load condition, M = 20.67, SD 
= 17.19, t(273) = 11.12, p < .01, d = 1.34, 95% CI [1.08, 1.60]. We also calculated the residual 





that positive residuals indicate overestimates and negative residuals indicate underestimates. 
There was no significant difference in average residuals between high (M = -10.32, SD = 27.50) 
and low (M = -6.82, SD = 17.99) cognitive load conditions, t(273) = 1.245, p = .21, d = -0.15, 
95% CI [-0.39, 0.09], and—more importantly—the distribution of residuals for both groups was 
normally distributed with a central tendency near zero, indicating that neither group ignored the 
task.  
 Finally, our analysis indicated that our administrators changed their behavioral noticeably 
when steering and not steering. The lineups lasted significantly longer (in seconds) when steering 
was present (M = 208.45, SD = 126.73) compared to when it was not present, M = 53.17, SD = 
74.55, t(247) = 11.70, p < .01, d = 1.48, 95% CI [1.20, 1.76]. Blind coders of the videos reported 
more overall pressure when the administrator was steering (M = 4.49, SD = 1.06) compared to 
not steering, M = 1.01, SD = 0.08, t(252) = 36.27, p < .01, d = 4.55, 95% CI [4.09, 5.01]. 
Witness Decisions 
 The participants selected the suspect 94 times (34%), a filler 122 times (44%), and 
rejected the lineup 63 times (23%). These numbers are broken down by each independent 
variable in Table 7. Next, we predicted these three outcomes using binary logistic regressions. 
 Predicting Decisions. Hypothesis 1 stated that steering would increase identifications of 
the suspect at that this effect would be moderated by cognitive load (with more cognitive load 
eliminating the effect) and financial motivation (with high motivation increasing the effect). To 
examine witness decisions, we used three binary logistic regression to predict identifications of 
the suspect versus non-suspect, identifications of fillers versus non-fillers, and lineup rejections 
versus non-rejections. The full model was tested, with main effects entered first, 2-way 





present in Table 8. No predictors significantly improved the model’s prediction for 
identifications of the suspect. However, Step 1 did significantly improve the model fit for 
predictions of filler identifications due to a significant main effect of steering, B = -.722, Wald 
χ2(1) = 8.63, p < .01, OR = 0.49, 95% CI [0.30, 0.79]. An odds ratio less than one indicates that 
steering significantly decreased the number of filler identifications, which is consistent with our 
training of the administrators, who were told to steer participants away from fillers. In the final 
regression model to predict lineup rejections, there was again only a significant model 
improvement at Step 1 due to a significant main effect of steering, B = 0.63, Wald χ2(1) = 4.53, p 
= .03, OR = 1.88, 95% CI [1.05, 3.36]. Here the results indicate that steering led to significantly 
more lineup rejections. Given these three results, it appears steering toward rejection was more 
successful than steering toward suspects. 
 Although not completely consistent with the hypothesis, these results are suggestive that 
steering had an effect consistent with training and the goals of the administrator. To analyze this 
effect in greater detail, we broke down the witness decisions by steering (see Table 9). The 
results indicate that that steering had a significant on the witness decisions, χ2(2) = 9.35, p < .01, 
V = .18. The residuals in Table 9 indicate that steering led to a reduction of filler IDs and an 
increase in both rejections and identifications of the suspect, albeit with a larger residual 
associated with the changes in rejections versus identifications of the suspect. 
 Given the significant main effect of steering consistent with the hypothesis, we ran 
planned comparisons to analyze the moderating effect of cognitive load and financial motivation 
on steering. The results for cognitive load are presented in Table 10. When cognitive load was 
low, there was a significant effect of steering, χ2(2) = 7.08, p = .03, V = .23. The residuals are 





when cognitive load was high, χ2(2) = 3.18, p = .20, V = .15. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that cognitive load interfered with cues given by the administrator. 
 For the moderating effect of financial motivation, we found results opposite our 
hypothesis (see Table 11). When no motivation was present, there was a significant effect of 
steering, χ2(2) = 6.54, p = .04, V = .22. The residuals are consistent with the main effect of 
steering. However, when offering a reward of $25 dollars, the effect of steering was no longer 
significant, χ2(2) = 3.45, p = .18, V = .16. This reversal, however, may make sense in light of the 
unforeseen effect and strong effect of steering on lineup rejections. In this case it may make 
sense that financial motivation—offered only for identifying the suspect—would decrease the 
ability of administrators to obtain identifications of fillers 
 Witness Decision Changes. Coders who rated the witness behavior on video were asked 
to indicate if the witnesses changed their decisions; that is, did they voice one choice before 
voicing a different choice for their final decision (see video coding and reliability). Overall, 47 of 
254 witnesses (18.5%) switched from their initial decision. There was a strong effect of steering, 
χ2(1) = 50.32, p < .01, V = .45, with 46 of the 47 (98%) switches occurring in the steering 
conditions. The pattern was consistent with administrator influence; initial witness choices were 
equally distributed among the suspect, fillers, and rejection but final choices were more likely to 
settle on the suspect or rejection (see Figure 5). Cognitive load and financial motivation did not 
moderate this effect. 
Witness Confidence 
 We hypothesized that decision consistent cues from the administrator would increase 
confidence whereas decision inconsistent cues from the administrator would decrease confidence 





the full model plus an additional factor to indicate whether the suspect was identified—a factor 
which could account for the consistency of the steering cues. There were no statistically 
significant effects at an alpha .05 level.  
 Witness Confidence Changes. There were very few confidence changes, and low initial 
agreement on when confidence changes occurred (see reliability section). There were 6 of 254 
(2.4%) participant who could be clearly classified as changing confidence after reconciliation 
coding (see Table 12). Notably, all were in the steering condition. Half changed their 
identification decision (all from fillers to the suspect) in addition to their confidence; half stayed 
with their original witness decision (one suspect, one filler, and one lineup rejection). In every 
case but one, confidence went down 
Witness Perceptions 
 Witness answered a number of survey items about their perceptions of the procedure. 
First, we present the results of the items concerning metacognition, then the results of the items 
about perceived bias. 
 Metacognitions. Participants rated the quality of their own memory on a number of 
items. First, we predicted witness metacognitive scale scores from the full model ANOVA. The 
only significant effect was a main effect of steering, F(1, 271) = 7.29, p = .007, η2 = .03. 
Participants self-reported they had a better memory for the crime after no steering (M = 4.28, SD 
= 0.81) than after steering (M = 4.02, SD = 0.75). Participants also predicted the distance the 
perpetrator in the film and how long his face was visible. For both variables, we used pairwise 
removal of a number of outliers (distance n = 4, time n = 7) before predicting each outcome from 
a full model ANOVA. Concerning ratings of the distance of the perpetrator, there was only a 





to that in the metacognitive survey; participants rated the perpetrator as farther away after 
steering occurred (M = 87.57 inches, SD = 37.58 inches) compared to after no steering occur (M 
= 77.38, SD = 41.68). There were no significant main effects or interactions on estimates of the 
time that the perpetrator’s face was visible. 
 Perceived Bias. We predicted scores on the witness bias scale from the full model 
ANOVA, there was only a main effect of influence, F(1, 271) = 124.53, p < .001, η2 = .32. 
Participants were able to detect that steering was biased, rating steering as more biased in the 
steering condition (M = 2.99, SD = 1.12) than the no steering condition (M =1.78, SD = 0.60). 
Participants also guessed whether the administrator knew which photo was of the suspect. We 
predicted this variable using the full model in a binary logistic regression. The only significant 
predictor was again steering, B = .662, Wald χ2(1) = 5.86, p = .015, OR = 1.94, 95% CI [1.13, 
3.31]. The odds ratio indicates that participants were more likely to guess that the lineup was 
single blind in the steering rather than the no steering condition. 
Study 2 Discussion 
 The primary goal of the Study 2 was to study the effect of information transfer—that is 
information about which photo is the suspect—on a witnesses’ identification decision. The 
strongest and consistent effect throughout the studies was the effect of steering; trained 
administrators were consistently able to steer participants away from fillers and toward the 
suspect or get them to reject the lineup. Steering was also able to get witnesses to switch from 
their original choice to a new choice—which undercuts the reliability of eyewitness 
identification. The results of switchers were stark (with almost all switches occurring in steering 
conditions) and convincing (movement almost always toward the suspect or lineup rejection). 





administrator to witness. This information is extra-legal and contaminates the process. In this 
experiment the steering was strong and as a result led participants to rate the procedure as more 
biased, to rate their memory as less reliable, and to correctly guess that the administrator knew 
the suspect. 
Although we expected an effect of steering based on past findings, replicating the 
steering effect adds to our applied knowledge and gives more evidence in support the double-
blind recommendation. It was very possible, after all, that participants would simply ignore 
steering and suggestion from administrators and instead stick with their initial decision. Indeed, 
many individuals likely think that they would react to steering in an unbiased and independent 
fashion. However, witnesses did make use of extra-legal information; participants were ready 
and willing to take cues from steering administrators. The switching results, in particular, 
indicate that witness gleaned information from nonblind administrators and used this information 
to influence their decisions—not decision criteria. When witnesses changed their initial 
identification decision, they typically switched from fillers to the suspect or a rejection, 
indicating newly gleaned information from the administrators who were steering them. 
Another goal of this study was to moderate the effects of administrator influence, 
increasing or decreasing the size of the steering effect with distraction (i.e., cognitive load) and 
motivation (i.e., a reward). We found evidence for the hypothesized effect of cognitive load. As 
expected, high cognitive load effectively reduced the ability of the witnesses to pick up on cues 
from an administrator about which photo to pick. The shape of the interaction was as predicted; 
high cognitive load eliminated the steering effect that was present under low cognitive load. It 
should be noted that the cognitive load manipulation was surprisingly effective. Participants did 





steering cues—high cognitive load effectively blocked these sometimes-obvious cues to which 
lineup member was the suspect.  
However, the financial motivation manipulation had an opposite effect than we 
hypothesized. The effect of steering was eliminated by financial motivation, not increased. 
Conversely, the effect of steering was detectable when financial incentives were not offered. One 
possible explanation for this pattern of effects, alluded to previously, may be that administrators 
were more effective at steering toward rejections than toward identifications of the suspect. Our 
original hypothesis regarding the moderating effect of financial motivation was premised on the 
belief that steering would get individuals to choose the suspect. In fact, steering got individuals 
to pick the suspect as well as reject the lineup. The effectiveness of rejection-steering would 
change our a priori based prediction. Steering toward the suspect is consistent with our reward, 
which was clearly premised on identifying the suspect. However, steering toward a rejection is 
inconsistent with our financial motivation; participants would have known that by rejecting the 
lineup—even though rejection was correct and they were getting steered to make that decision—
that they would not earn the extra money. One possible explanation, therefore, is that the 
financial motivation worked, but the manipulation motivated participants to ignore cues to reject 
(as observed) rather than use cues to identify the suspect (as hypothesized). This alternative 
explanation is consistent with the data observed here and could be tested a priori by ensuring that 
the operationalizations of motivation and steering are consistent—for instance motivating correct 
decisions and then steering toward correct rejections—and then observing a “flip” in the 
interaction in the direction we originally hypothesized. An additional way to think of this, and 
future tests, is to recognize that witness can likely be motivated to both use and ignore the cues 





Thus, a key issue that remains to be tested in future research is whether different forms of 
witness motivation produce different patterns of identification decisions. The precise nature the 
motivation of actual witnesses is unknown and understudied. It appears, based on these results, 
that it may be possible to motivate witnesses to do many different things during a lineup. The 
unknowns surrounding motivation present avenues for further research on what motivations 
witnesses bring to real-world lineups and how those motivations affect identification decisions. 
Surprisingly, there were no significant effects of information transfer on confidence. Past 
research has shown that confirming feedback does increase witness confidence (Douglass & 
Steblay, 2006; Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Moreover, from a theoretical 
standpoint, this paper has assumed an expectancy effect model mediated by information cues 
sent by an administrator. These cues, which may be both consistent and inconsistent with the 
decision of the witness, should affect confidence, and this has been observed under some 
conditions (i.e, Charman & Quiroz, 2016). Yet here we did not find any empirical evidence of 
confidence inflation with consistent cues or confidence deflation with inconsistent cues. One 
explanation is that confidence was not the primary outcome of interest in this study. As such, it 
may be that our script gave participants both consistent and inconsistent cues at times, which 
would interfere with any confidence effects. The script required RAs to only give clear 
confirming feedback (smiles, “good job”) when the witness selected the suspect, and this did not 
happen very often, limiting the opportunity for clear confirming feedback. Additionally, the 
script forced RAs to change tactics often and even switch goals—steering toward rejections—to 
avoid filler identifications. The ability to change tactics—designed to increase the effect of 
steering and allow adaptability—may have sent mixed signals to the witness, or even convinced 





Related to the issue of confidence is the issue of meta-cognitions. As far as we know, this 
is the first study to show that steering decreases witnesses’ confidence in their own memories. 
Participants reported that administrators were more biased when steering than when not steering, 
indicating that they noticed the administrator trying to influence them—a finding that is 
consistent with past research (e.g., Alberts et al., 2008). In addition, however, steering led to 
decreased scores on the metacognitive scale and increased ratings of the distance of the 
perpetrator from the camera. A possible explanation is that witnesses confronted with an 
administrator steering them toward a photo that did not match their memory caused the witnesses 
to discount the strength of their own memory for the actual perpetrator. This explanation 
indicates that witnesses do trust information coming from an administrator and that they use this 
information—in this case that they are making an incorrect decision—to adjust their 
metacognitions appropriately. In this way, the observed effect of steering on metacognitions is 
the opposite of the confidence inflation effect due to confirming feedback (Douglass & Steblay, 
2006).  
 There are also some important limitations to this study. Although we used stimulus 
sampling for the lineups, we did not use stimulus sampling for our manipulations. Something 
unknown about the tone tasks or financial motivation may be causing the specific results. 
Furthermore, given time constraints and data elimination, our study was sufficiently powered but 
not overly so, especially considering analyses where we added predictive factors, such as in the 
confidence analyses. Most important, however, our methods lacked some features of ecological 
validity. Our videos were pixilated. Our steering manipulation was obvious (although video 
evidence suggests that steering in real identification procedures can be heavy handed). Our 





manipulation lack realism; no witness would ever be asked to do these specific tasks, even if we 
can imagine real world witnesses who are distracted or highly motivated. Although the 
manipulations successfully altered psychological processes that may be important in the 
identification context, the lack of ecological validity should be accompanied with caution when 
attempting to generalize these findings to actual identification procedures. 
The limitations were the result of a conscious effort to focus on theoretical insights and 
the goal of better understanding the social interaction between administrator and witness. Despite 
limitations in ecological validity, this project makes both a theoretical and applied contribution. 
From a theoretical standpoint, both motivation and ability manipulations affected witnesses’ 
identification decisions (albeit not the hypothesized motivation effect). These findings suggest 
that the Elaboration Likelihood Model can be a useful theoretical guide to understanding 
information transfer between administrator and witness. Moving forward, researchers can 
continue to build a social interaction model of eyewitness-administrator interaction. From an 
applied standpoint, these findings—especially the findings regarding the effect of steering on 





Chapter 4: General Discussion 
In summary, the goal of this project was to examine the transfer of extra-legal 
information from a nonblind administrator to a witness during a lineup administration. We 
proposed a taxonomy of moderators for information transfer based on the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model of persuasion, which posit that a person will process information when motivated and 
able. Specifically, administrators should transmit cues and witnesses will receive cues when they 
are motivated and able to do so. The aim of our first study was to analyze cue transmission by an 
administrator. However, there was little to indicate that nonblind administrators were 
transmitting more cues than blind administrators. A possible explanation—which can be seen in 
the fact that motivation but not administrator blindness affected observer’s coding of the overall 
pressure from the administrator—is that financial motivation encouraged blind administrators to 
pressure witnesses to pick someone from the lineup, despite not knowing which photo was 
depicted the suspect. Without differential cue transmission between single-blind and double-
blind conditions, it was impossible to test for moderators of differential cue transmission. In the 
second study, we found the hypothesized interaction between cognitive load and steering. When 
participants were under low cognitive load and paired with administrators who were steering 
their choices, they were more likely to pick suspects and to reject the lineup subsequent steering 
than when paired with administrators who did not steer them, suggesting that they were picking 
up on the cues sent by the steering administrators. When under high cognitive load, participants 
were unaffected by the cues sent by the administrators; they were equally likely to pick suspects 
and to reject the lineup irrespective of whether the administrator sent cues. Also, in this second 
study, we found an interaction between motivation and steering but not in the hypothesized 





than were participants who lacked a financial motivation to pick the suspect, again due to the 
possibility that participants were motivated to choose from the lineup—despite the warning that 
the suspect might not be present. Overall, however, the results from the second study support the 
theory that information transfer from administrators to witnesses occurs, that motivation and 
ability variables can moderate this transfer, and that the motivation and ability taxonomy can aid 
prediction of when information transfer might be more likely to occur. 
 There are also three implications when looking at the results of both studies together. The 
first implication is that social interaction is a critical part of lineups, even though there may be 
other ways to apply dual-process models to lineups. The second implication, resulting from the 
data on motivation, indicate that the motivations of witnesses can have a meaningful effect on 
behavior, should be operationalized in multiple ways, and is largely unstudied in real-world 
witnesses. Finally, the results have practical implications, providing strong support for the use of 
double-blind procedures and video recording of lineups. We deal with each of these four 
implications in turn. 
Dual-Process Models of Information Transfer in Identification Procedures 
 The variables manipulated in this study drew heavily on the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) for inspiration. A primary goal of this research was to test whether the ability and 
motivation taxonomy provided by the ELM would also moderate the transfer of information 
between nonblind administrators and witnesses. To some degree the application of dual process 
models to the lineup administration context was a success; ability and motivation had a 
moderating influence in Study 2, and the cognitive load effect worked as expected. Furthermore, 
although almost every study of administrator influence has shown that the ability of the 





research was the first time that a study demonstrated that the ability of the witness to receive that 
information affects lineup decisions as well. This effect of motivation and ability is a prediction 
derived directly from ELM and indicates that further study of this model applied to lineups may 
prove useful. Moreover, the moderating effect of witness ability to receive administrator cues 
indicates that social factors must be accounted for in future models of witnesses’ identification 
decisions made during single-blind lineup lineups. 
 In another sense, however, the test of the model was not successful. The effects of 
financial motivation did not occur as expected. In addition, the effects of administrator cues did 
not influence witness confidence in the ways that we had expected. We deal with the 
implications of each of these findings on their own in the next sections. But taken together, the 
results regarding motivation and confidence could indicate that the model is not correctly 
specified—at least when applied to eyewitness interactions. Therefore, a question resulting from 
this study is whether there are other conceptualizations or methods of applying the ELM or other 
dual-process models to eyewitnesses that may better explain the data and could be tested for in 
the future. 
 As a reminder, the ELM is a dual process model that posits that the method of processing 
a persuasive argument will influence whether someone will be persuaded by that argument. The 
key variables in the model were manipulated in a foundational study by Chaiken and 
Maheswaren (1994). Participants read a review about a tech product (answering machine), which 
served as the information to be processed. The review argued that the product was superior to 
other products on the market and compared the products on a number of features. The authors 
varied the strength of the persuasive argument by manipulating which features were reviewed; 





emphasized many nonessential features of the product, and the ambiguous argument emphasized 
both essential and non-essential features. Message strength aimed to manipulate ability of a 
message receiver to process the information; participants were expected to be able to correctly 
evaluate the strong and weak information, but unable to evaluate the ambiguous information. 
Chaiken and Maheswaren manipulated motivation by convincing some participants that their 
opinions were important (i.e., self-relevant, one of a few data points) while convincing other 
participants that their opinions were unimportant (i.e., averaged with other, not self-relevant). 
Last, Chaiken and Maheswaren manipulated source credibility to be either high or low; half the 
reviews came from a reputable source while the other half did not. This final manipulation 
served as peripheral information.  
The argument for the ELM is that participants will be persuaded by persuasive arguments 
when they are able and motivated to elaborate on (i.e., systematically process) the information. If 
either motivation or ability is lacking, participants will make use of the heuristics to process 
peripheral information (if it is available), rating the product favorably after reading a review 
from a reputable source but not after reading a review from a disreputable. This pattern of effects 
is exactly what the authors found. When the task was not important, participants did not rate the 
product differently based on argument strength, but instead were affected only by source 
credibility—ranking the product as better when it came from a reputable source. When the 
importance of the task was high, participants were able to differentiate among argument strength, 
ranking the product more favorably after the strong argument than the weak argument. However, 
when the argument was ambiguous—and even though task importance was high—participants 
instead relied on source credibility to form object attitudes. In other words, the ambiguous 





peripheral information (and the heuristic that reputable sources can be trusted) to help them form 
their opinion. 
In applying the ELM to the administrator-eyewitness interaction model, we have argued 
that aspects of this model apply to the lineup interaction. For instance, in Study 2, we postulated 
that extra-legal information from the administrator was the equivalent of a message and that 
witness participants would process that message only if motivated and able. To directly draw the 
comparisons with the study performed by Chaiken and Maheswaren, high cognitive load would 
be similar to the ambiguous message, because it was designed to interfere with ability to process. 
High financial motivation would be like the high importance manipulation, creating motivation 
to process. When motivational and ability were low, we hypothesized that witnesses would be 
unable to use steering information from the lineup administrator to make a decision—just like 
the participants in Chaiken and Maheswaren who were unable to use information in the review to 
form attitudes. 
Our original interpretation may still be useful for understanding identification decisions 
made during single-blind lineups, especially given the support we found for the cognitive load 
effects on decision making. However, there is another way to apply the ELM to lineup. In this 
application, memory would serve as the persuasive message; that is to say that memory should 
be processed effortfully and in a systematic way—if witnesses are motivated by accuracy. Cues 
from the administrator would serve as peripheral information on which the witness relies when 
superficially processing because they are unwilling or unable to use elaboration/systematic 
processing. This metaphor provides new insights into the possible effects of motivation and 
ability on the use of administrator cues. In this case, the model would predict that witnesses 





motivated by accuracy in much the same way perceivers in the ELM are motivated by accuracy, 
see Petty & Wegener, 1999, p. 44). However, they will not rely on this memory if they are 
unmotivated to do so. It is difficult to imagine a real world case where a witness would be 
unmotivated to rely on their memory or put much effort into recalling and processing their 
memory (which is where this extension of the model may not make sense) but low motivation 
witnesses might exist for less severe crimes that are not self-relevant or did not victimize the 
witness. Witnesses also might not rely on their memory if they were unable. Real world 
equivalence is more probable in this hypothetical, where many estimator variables—like the 
presence of a weapon, lighting, distance, stress—could lower memory quality to the point where 
a memory is unable to be used by the witness. In these cases, the model would predict that 
witnesses would be more likely to rely on cues from the administrator. There is some mixed 
evidence that supports search for additional information when memory is weak from other 
studies. For instance, we found that longer retention intervals increased reliance on administrator 
cues (Zimmerman et al., 2017) but surprisingly shorter encoding intervals did not (Evelo et al., 
2020), possibly because the manipulation was insufficient. 
A question that results from the new application of dual process models is whether cues 
from the administrator could operate as peripheral information. A key defining quality of 
peripheral information is that it leads to less attitude change and can be easily processed using 
heuristics (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegner, 1999). The peripheral cue in this case, 
would therefore have to be processed easily, with a heuristic like “trust the police”, which 
encouraged people to rely on cueing information. The peripheral information would also have to 
be available. The basic dual process theories do state that information must be available to be 





cognitive load in Study 2 did not interrupt the heuristic processing but eliminated accessibility of 
the information which the witness could have processed peripherally. In other words, participants 
would need the access to information to attend to that information, regardless of the level of 
processing they use. This is still consistent with the result from Study 2, which show quite 
clearly that witnesses can be distracted almost completely from any information coming from the 
administrator.  
The take-away message is that these models may not fit the data perfectly, but some 
application of information processing models may help guide our understanding of witness-
administrator interactions. It seems there are multiple sources of information for witnesses to 
process, and they may process this information in different ways. The simplest application may 
be best. Eyewitnesses are motivated to make an accurate decision. They will seek out 
information from their memory to help them make this decision. They may also seek out 
additional information from the social environment, especially if their memory is weak. Both 
sources of information, memorial and social, will only be used if the information is available to 
the witness and if the witness is motivated and able to use it.  
Motivation 
In both studies, we attempted to manipulate the motivation of legal actors. In the first 
study, we attempted to motivate the transmission of cues, and in the second we tried to motivate 
the receipt and use of sent cues. Both manipulations failed, possibly because the motivation 
manipulations produced unintended consequences. In both cases, the reward motivation was 
financial and large in comparison to the compensation for participation in the study but 
contingent upon choosing behavior (as opposed to correct lineup rejections). It is possible that 





was always better than rejection. We may have created a situation in which participants—like 
lottery hopefuls—knew they had to play to win. The findings from the studies support this 
conclusion. In the Cue Transmission Study, the most consistent effect was of motivation on the 
pressure applied by the administrator—not to choose the suspect—but to choose anyone. There 
is a possibility that when administrators could not get the witness to identify the suspect, they 
urged the witness to pick anyone because they assumed a one out of six chance is better than 
nothing. In Study 2, this motivation to pick someone rather than no one would also explain why 
the financial manipulation caused participants to ignore cues from the administrator to reject the 
lineup. Evidence for this possible explanation is that both studies showed very high choosing 
rates (Study 1, 85%; Study 2, 77%), especially considering that the lineups were all culprit 
absent. Other areas of the eyewitness literature show much smaller choosing rates in eyewitness 
lineups. One meta-analysis found that the literature on lineup presentation (Steblay et al., 2001) 
has closer to 51% simultaneous and 28% sequential choosing in culprit-absent scenarios. An 
examination of regularities in all eyewitness identification decisions indicated that culprit absent 
lineups tended to be rejected 52% of the time (Clark et al., 2008). 
A related possibility is that our design failed to sufficiently motivate all administrators—
not just those in the reward condition. Although we motivated half the administrators with the 
financial reward, past studies (e.g., Zimmerman et al., 2017) have motivated all administrators in 
some way or another. This motivation may be required to get administrators in single-blind 
lineups to send information that administrators in double-blind lineups do not. 
 In summary, there were unforeseen complications with our operationalization and design 
choices regarding motivation. The fact that we have failed to sufficiently motivate participants or 





have failed to study different type of motivations and know very little about the motivations of 
witnesses. Most published research seems to assume that witnesses are motivated to identify the 
suspect, but only few have tested whether this assumption is valid. For example, one recent study 
(Eisen et al., 2017) found that participant who thought they were witnesses to a real crime were 
apparently more motivated to make an identification, indicating they felt more pressure to choose 
and were 2.5 times more likely to make a choice from real showups than in a lab simulation. But 
as the results here show, witnesses may be motivated by things other than accuracy and desire to 
catch a culprit. We found both administrators and witnesses were affected by a reward; when 
offered a reward, administrators put pressure on witnesses to choose, and witnesses were more 
likely to ignore cues to reject the lineup. In both cases, the reward motivated behavior that was 
technically incorrect, indicating that both administrators and witness can be motivated to do 
things in a lineup other than catch a culprit. Many other motivations may occur in the real world. 
For instance, witnesses may be motivated to not implicate the wrong person. They may be tired 
and motivated by a desire to leave the police station, to not get involved, to avoid going to trial, 
or to avoid reprisals from a criminal or his accomplices. Additionally, the findings from this 
study show that different motivations may have counterintuitive effects on how a witness 
interprets cues from a lineup administrator. Researchers should explore what motivations 
witnesses bring with them to a lineup and not assume their only motivation is to identify the 
suspect.  
Practical Implications 
Although these studies have focused on the modeling the theoretical interaction between 
eyewitness and administrator, there are also lessons from these results that apply to actual 





blind manner. Although we did not find an effect of administrator knowledge in Study 1, we did 
find a clear and convincing effect of administrator behavior (steering) in Study 2.  Study 2 
administrators were able to influence the choices of their witnesses except when cognitive load 
interfered with this influence. This study also shows that the information able to be passed from 
administrator to witness is extra-legal, that is, not from memory. Moreover, and most drastically, 
Study 2 administrators were able to get a large number of witnesses to actually go against initial 
choices and end up choosing the suspect or rejecting the lineup. Overall, these results support the 
idea that administrators can influence witnesses and adds to the literature on administrator 
influence (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). 
The second practical implication is that lineups must be video recorded. In fact, video 
recording of lineups is now an official recommendation of the American-Psychology Law 
Society (Wells et al., 2020), and the evidence here supports that recommendation. Blind coders, 
using nothing but video tapes, were able to detect motivated administrators in Study 1, somewhat 
able to detect administrator knowledge in Study 1, and steering in Study 2. These results support 
the idea that video tapes can be important tools to detect improper influence by legal decision 
makers. The results from the video tapes also showed that motivated administrators (Study 1) 
and steering administrators (Study 2) tended to produce longer lineups. The video tapes were 
especially crucial to Study 2 in showing that some witness had changed their initial decision to 
conform to the desire of the administrator. Without videotapes, this evidence would have been 
lost. Video tapes are the only way to preserve an accurate record of the entire lineup proceedings 






In conclusion, these studies provide useful data for eyewitness theory and applied lineup 
issues. These data support continued use of an of the administrator-eyewitness interaction model, 
although key aspects of the model—such as what counts as peripheral cueing—will need 
clarification. Ability and motivation variables moderated information transfer in Study 2. Both 
studies showed the need for continued study of motivation, confidence, and issues surrounding 
confidence-accuracy calibration. Most important, these findings are consistent with the continued 
recommendation of double-blind procedures and video recording in actual lineups (Wells et al., 






Demographic Data for Both Administrators and Witnesses 
 Administrators  Witnesses  Total 
 n %  n %  n % 
Gender         
Female 183 59  194 61  377 60 
Male 129 41  120 38  249 40 
Other 1 --  3 1  4 1 
Total 313 100  317 100  630 100 
         
Race/Ethnicity         
Asian 31 10  34 11  65 10 
Black/African American 101 32  107 34  208 33 
Hispanic/Latinx 90 29  74 23  164 26 
White/European American 67 21  75 24  142 23 
Other/Mixed 25 8  27 9  52 8 
Total 314 100  317 100  631 100 
         
Education         
Less than High School 5 2  1 --  6 1 
High School or Equivalent 178 57  202 64  380 60 
College Graduate 106 34  91 29  197 31 
Post Graduate Degree 22 7  22 7  44 7 
Total 311 100  316 100  627 1 
         
Note. Data is deleted pairwise. Percent values are for valid cases only. Dash marks indicate that 







A Priori Lineup Mock Witness and Fairness Results 





 N Hits (%) E 95 % CI 
Lineup 1 65 8 (12) 8.13 4.38 4.18 [3.41, 5.40] 
Lineup 2 66 9 (14) 7.33 3.91 3.51 [2.81, 4.69] 
Lineup 3 67 7 (10) 9.57 5.24 5.52 [4.87, 6.38] 






A Posteriori Lineup Fairness Results 






Resultant Tredoux E 
 N Hits (%) E 95 % CI 
Study 1       
Lineup 1 29 11 (38) 2.64 3.36 3.64 [2.79, 5.22] 
Lineup 2 29 4 (14) 7.25 3.62 4.5 [3.36, 6.81] 
Lineup 3 29 4 (14) 7.25 3.62 4.27 [3.11, 6.82] 
       
Study 2       
Lineup 1 40 26 (65) 1.54 2.64 2.18 [1.61, 3.38] 
Lineup 2 35 20 (29) 3.5 3.21 3.45 [2.60, 5.12] 
Lineup 3 40 6 (15) 6.67 3.75 2.77 [2.18, 3.81] 
Note. See Quigley-McBride and Wells (2020) for assessing resultant lineup size and Malpass et 






Number of Administrators Engaging in Biasing Behaviors by Knowledge Conditions 
 D-B S-B    
Administrator Behavior n % n % χ2 p θ 
1. Said he/she was a detective/cop/law 
enforcement(etc.) 
8 8 8 7 0.09 .770 −.02 
2.  Told the witness to take their time 
 
31 29 43 35 0.93 .334 .06 
3. Told the witness to look carefully 
 
10 9 16 13 0.76 .383 .06 
4. Asked/prompted the witness to describe the 
features of the perpetrator 
36 34 33 27 1.28 .257 −.08 
5. Asked/prompted witness to compare 
photographs 
12 11 18 15 0.59 .444 .05 
7. Pointed or tapped at a photo/s 
 
30 28 42 34 0.99 .321 .07 
8. Asked about a specific photo/s 
 
28 26 31 25 0.03 .863 −.01 
9. Said "it seems like you're looking a long 
time at this photo" 
4 4 13 11 3.89 .048 .13 
10. Asked the witness to think about a 
photograph from another angle or profile 
21 20 24 20 0.00 .979 −.00 
13. Asked "are you sure" after an ID was 
made 
27 26 33 27 0.07 .787 .02 
14. Removed photos/allowed photos to be 
removed 
27 26 32 26 0.02 .896 .01 
15. Returned photos/allowed photos to be 
returned 
8 8 12 10 0.37 .542 .04 
16. Had the witness to take another look after 
initially rejecting the lineup 
12 11 15 12 0.05 .820 .02 
17. Had the witness to take another look after 
making an initial ID 
14 13 23 19 1.33 .249 .08 
18. Repeated witness’s choice in questioning 
manner 
30 28 34 28 0.01 .942 −.01 
19. Paused before recording the ID and 
uttered "okay" or similar hedge 
32 30 45 37 1.14 .286 .07 
20. Told the witness he/she knows which 
photo is of the suspect 
3 3 8 7 1.72 .190 .09 
21. Told the witness he/she does not know 
which photo is of the suspect 
7 7 1 1 5.61 .018 −.16 
22. Told the witness that this is for a real case 
 
6 6 9 7 0.27 .602 .04 
23. Mentioned financial bonus of some sort 
 





Note. Number represent item on the coding sheets in Appendix N. Items 6, 11, and 12 are 
omitted due to poor reliability. Percent values are valid within administrator knowledge 






Number of Administrators Engaging in Suspect Specific Behaviors by Knowledge Conditions 
 Photo Type    
Behavior Fillers (%) Mixed (%) Suspect (%) χ2 p V 
7. Pointed or tapped at a photo/s 4.18 .124 .24 
Blind 19 (63) 6 (20) 5 (17)    
Nonblind 17 (41) 17 (41) 8 (19)    
       
8. Asked about a specific photo/s 1.87 .394 .18 
Blind 18 (67) 4 (15) 5 (19)    
Nonblind 16 (52) 9 (29) 6 (19)    
       
9. Said "it seems like you're looking a long time at this photo" 0.11 .994 .09 
Blind 1 (25) 1 (25) 2 (50)    
Nonblind 3 (25) 4 (33) 5 (42)    
       
10. Asked to think about a photograph from another angle 0.27 .873 .09 
Blind 10 (53) 6 (32) 3 (16)    
Nonblind 8 (44) 7 (39) 3 (17)    
       
13. Asked "are you sure" after an ID was made 0.13 .722 .05 
Blind 19 (79) 0 (0) 5 (21)    
Nonblind 21 (75) 0 (0) 7 (25)    
       
14. Removed photos/allowed photos to be removed 1.06 .303 .14 
Blind 7 (27) 19 (73) 0 (0)    
Nonblind 12 (40) 18 (60) 0 (0)    
       
15. Returned photos/allowed photos to be returned 1.54 .464 .30 
Blind 3 (43) 4 (57) 0 (0)    
Nonblind 2 (20) 7 (70) 1 (10)    
Note. Items 6, 11, and 12 are omitted due to poor reliability. Item counts do not match item 











All Witness Choices in All Conditions: Cue Transmission 
   D-B  S-B  Total 
Motivation Conditions Decision  n %  n %  n % 
No Confession           
No Reward Suspect  2 6  6 17  8 17 
 Filler  26 76  25 71  51 71 
 Reject  6 18  4 11  10 11 
 Total  34 100  35 100  69 100 
  
 
        
$25 Reward Suspect  5 19  8 31  13 25 
 Filler  18 67  14 54  32 60 
 Reject  4 15  4 15  8 15 
 Total  27 100  26 100  53 100 
  
 
        
Confession           
No Reward Suspect  6 20  7 18  13 19 
 Filler  16 53  27 71  43 63 
 Reject  8 27  4 11  12 18 
 Total  30 100  38 100  68 100 
  
 
        
$25 Reward Suspect  6 25  7 19  13 21 
 Filler  15 63  26 70  41 67 
 Reject  3 13  4 11  7 11 
 Total  24 100  37 100  61 100 
Note. Percent values are valid within administrator knowledge conditions; D-B = Double-blind; 







All Witness Choices in All Conditions: Cue Reception Study 2 
   No Steering  Steering  Total 
Conditions Decision  n %  n %  n % 
Low Cognitive Load           
No Reward Suspect  10 29  11 31  21 30 
 Filler  19 54  10 29  29 41 
 Reject  6 17  14 40  20 29 
 Total  35 100  35 100  70 100 
  
 
        
$25 Reward Suspect  10 29  11 31  21 30 
 Filler  17 49  12 34  29 41 
 Reject  8 23  12 34  20 29 
 Total  35 100  35 100  70 100 
  
 
        
High Cognitive Load           
No Reward Suspect  9 26  16 46  25 36 
 Filler  20 57  14 40  34 49 
 Reject  6 17  5 14  11 16 
 Total  35 100  35 100  70 100 
  
 
        
$25 Reward Suspect  13 38  14 40  27 39 
 Filler  17 50  13 37  30 43 
 Reject  4 12  8 23  12 17 
 Total  34 100  35 100  69 100 






Model Fit Statistics for Predicting Binary Witness Decisions 
 χ2 df p −2 LL R2 
Suspect      
Step 1 3.30 3 .347 353.24 .01 
Step 2 1.19 3 .755 352.05 .02 
Step 3 0.63 1 .427 351.42 .02 
Filler      
Step 1 9.57 3 .023 372.81 .03 
Step 2 0.83 3 .842 371.98 .04 
Step 3 0.11 1 .740 371.87 .04 
Reject      
Step 1 10.50 3 .015 287.56 .04 
Step 2 0.93 3 .819 286.63 .04 
Step 3 1.78 1 .182 284.85 .05 






The Effect of Steering on All Lineup Decisions 
Conditions Suspect Filler Reject Total 
No Steering     
Observed 42 73 24 139 
Expected 46.8 60.8 31.4 139.0 
Percent 30 53 17 100 
Residual −0.7 1.6 −1.3  
     
Steering     
Observed 52 49 39 140 
Percent 47.2 61.2 31.6 140.0 
Expected 37 35 28 100 
Residual 0.7 −1.6 1.3  






The Effect of Steering at Each Level of Cognitive Load 
Conditions Suspect Filler Reject Total 
Low Cognitive Load     
No Steering     
Observed 20 36 14 70 
Expected 21.0 29.0 20.0 70.0 
Percent 29 51 20 100 
Residual −0.2 1.3 −1.3  
     
Steering     
Observed 22 22 26 70 
Percent 21.0 29.0 20.0 70.0 
Expected 31 31 37 100 
Residual 0.2 −1.3 1.3  
     
High Cognitive Load     
No Steering     
Observed 22 37 10 69 
Expected 25.8 31.8 11.4 69.0 
Percent 32 54 15 100 
Residual −0.8 0.9 −0.4  
     
Steering     
Observed 30 27 13 70 
Percent 26.2 32.2 11.6 70.0 
Expected 43 39 19 100 
Residual 0.7 −0.9 0.4  






The Effect of Steering at Each Level of Pay Motivation 
Conditions Suspect Filler Reject Total 
No Reward     
No Steering     
Observed 19 39 12 70 
Expected 23.0 31.5 15.5 70.0 
Percent 27 56 17 100 
Residual −0.8 1.3 −0.9  
     
Steering     
Observed 27 24 19 70 
Percent 23.0 31.5 15.5 70.0 
Expected 38 34 27 100 
Residual 0.8 −1.3 0.9  
     
$25 Reward     
No Steering     
Observed 23 34 12 69 
Expected 23.8 29.3 15.9 69.0 
Percent 33 49 17 100 
Residual −0.2 0.9 −1.0  
     
Steering     
Observed 25 25 20 70 
Percent 24.2 29.7 16.1 70.0 
Expected 36 36 29 100 
Residual 0.2 −0.9 1.0  






Participants who Changed Confidence 
  
Confidence  Lineup Choice 
Participant 
 
Original Final  Original Final 
57  25 60  Filler Suspect 
68  100 90  N/A Filler 
134  80 70  N/A Suspect 
139  85 70  Filler Suspect 
199  75 50  N/A Suspect 
254  90 70  Filler Reject 
Note. Participant numbers are used to identify data and are arbitrary. Individuals who did not 






The Generic Expectancy Effect Mediation Model 
 
Note. This model is adapted from the multiple sources (Jussim, 1986; Rosenthal, 2002; Trusz & 
Bąbel, 2016). Each box represents potential measured variables. The first box represents 
predictor or independent variables. The second box represents mediators. The third box 
represents potential outcome or dependent variables. Each arrow represents the effect of one 
variable on another. The model is theoretical; error is not represented. Adapted from “Covert 
Communication in Classrooms, Clinics, Courtrooms, and Cubicles,” by R. Rosenthal, 2002, 
American Psychologist, 57, p. 845. Copyright [2002] by the American Psychological 












The Administrator-Eyewitness Interaction Model 
 
Note. The model is based on the generic expectancy effect mediation (see Figure 1) but applies 
the crucial eyewitness variables for the independent, mediating, and dependent variables. 
Furthermore, the model includes a hypothesized framework of moderators which may change 
each effect. The administrator’s characteristics (motivation and ability to send cues) moderate 
the effect of the administrator’s expectations on the administrator’s behavior. The witness’s 
characteristics (motivation and ability to use cues) moderate the effect of the administrator’s 









Motivation and Ability 
Witness’s 
Characteristics: 






Lineups Used in the Cue Transmission Study (Study 1) 
 
Figure 3. Panel 1, 2, 3, contain Lineups 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Panel 4 are the perpetrators, in 
lineup order. The innocent suspects for Lineups 1, 2 and 3 are in positions 4, 3, and 5, 





color on separate 4” × 6” glossy photo paper, labeled as Photo #1-6 on the back. Participants 






Count of Times Each Photo Was Selected by Switchers 
 
Note. This figure indicates the choices of switchers (n = 46, participants who changed their 
choice). Gray bars represent the number of switchers that selected each photo as their original 
choice. The black bars represent the number of switchers that selected each photo as their final 


















Appendix A: Craigslist Example Flyer in Studies 1 and 2 
 
Study 1 
Recruiting people to participate in a study of how people make legal decisions.  The study will take place 
at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice (on 11th Avenue). During the study, you will watch a video, 
complete a task with another participant, and give your impressions on the task.  
 
You will be PAID $20 in cash for 45 minutes of your time.  
 
You must be fluent in English and be at least 18 years old to participate. If you would like to 
participate, please contact the researcher at koveralab.HOR@jjay.cuny.edu 
 
Study 2 
Recruiting people to participate in a study of how people make legal decisions.  The study will 
take place at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice (on 11th Avenue). During the study, you 
will watch a video, participate in a task, and give you impressions on the task.  
 
You will be PAID $20 in cash for 45 minutes of your time.  
 
You must be fluent in English and be at least 18 years old to participate. If you would like to 





Appendix B: Lineup Filler Tasks in Study 1 & 2 
 
Dinosaur Word Search Puzzles 
 
 
Can you find these dinosaur names in the grid?  
• ALLOSAURUS   MONOCLONIUS  
• PROTOCERATOPS   APATOSAURUS  
• CERATOSAURUS   SPINOSAURUS  
• COELOPHYSIS   ANKYLOSAURUS 
• DIPLODOCUS    STEGOSAURUS  
• STYRACOSAURUS   IGUANODON  
• KENTROSAURUS   GALLIMIMUS  
• TRACHODON   TRICERATOPS 





Animal Word Search Puzzle 
 
Find and circle all of the words that are hidden in the grid. 






























Appendix C: Administrator Questionnaire in Study 1 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements by checking a 
box on the scale below: 
 
1. The witness’s lineup decision would provide useful information for police if this were a real-
life criminal investigation. 












2. I pressured the witness to identify someone in this lineup. 












3. I tried to get the witness to pick a particular person in the lineup. 












4. I was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration. 












5. I believe that my behavior influenced the decision made by the witness in this lineup. 












6. All things considered, the lineup administration was fair and unbiased. 
















Instructions: Please tell us a little bit about the lineup you just conducted. 
 
1.  Do you remember what the suspect in this case was charged with? (check one) 
☐ Robbery 
☐ Burglary  
☐ Assault 
☐ All of the above 
☐ I don’t remember 
 
2. Do you remember anything about a confession in the case? (check one) 
☐ Yes, I was told the suspect confessed 
☐ No, I was not told anything about a confession  
☐ I don’t remember either way 
 
3. Were you told the importance of getting the witness to obtain an identification of the 
suspect? (check one) 
☐ Yes 
☐ No  
☐ I don’t remember 
 
4. Were you offered any financial compensation if the witness identified the suspect (other 
than $20 for participating)? (check one) 
☐ Yes, $___________ (specify amount) 
☐ No  
☐ I don’t remember 
 
5. On the following scale, how motivated were you to get the witness to identify the 
suspect? 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 














Instructions: Finally, please tell us a little about yourself. 
 
1.  What is your age?  _________________ 
 
2. What Gender do you identify with? 
☐ Male  
☐ Female 
☐ Other __________________________________ 
 
3. With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify with? 
☐ American Indian or Alaskan Native 
☐ Asian 
☐ Black or African American 
☐ Hispanic, Latino, or Latina 
☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
☐ White or European American 
☐ Other  __________________________________ 
                                                    
4.  What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? 
☐ Less than high school 
☐ High School degree or equivalent 
☐ College graduate 
☐ Post graduate degree 
 
 
Appendix D: Witness Questionnaire in Study 1 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements by checking a 
box on the scale below: 
 
1.  During the video, I had a good view of the perpetrator. 












2. During the video, I had a good opportunity to view the perpetrator’s face. 












3. I paid attention to the perpetrator during the videotaped crime. 












4. I felt that it was easy to make a lineup decision. 












5. I made a lineup decision quickly. 











   
6. I would be willing to testify about my lineup decision at trial. 












7. I have a good memory for strangers’ faces. 












8. I can clearly see the image of the perpetrator in my mind. 














9. I would trust an eyewitness who had a similar viewing experience to mine. 












10. My lineup decision would provide useful information for the police if this were a real-life 
criminal investigation. 












11. The administrator pressured me to identify someone in this lineup. 












12. The lineup administrator was trying to get me to pick a particular person in the lineup. 












13. The administrator of this lineup was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration. 












14. The administrator’s behavior while conducting the lineup influenced my identification 
decision. 












15. All things considered, the lineup administration was fair and unbiased. 























And some additional questions: 
 
1. During the video, how far away was the perpetrator from the camera.  
 
_______ feet _______ inches 
 
2. During the video, how long was the perpetrator’s face in your view? 
 
_______ seconds  
  
3. Do you think the administrator knew who the suspect is? 
 




































Instructions: Finally, please tell us a little about yourself. 
 
1.  What is your age?  _________________ 
 
2. What Gender do you identify with? 
☐ Male  
☐ Female 
☐ Other __________________________________ 
 
3. With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify with? 
☐ American Indian or Alaskan Native 
☐ Asian 
☐ Black or African American 
☐ Hispanic, Latino, or Latina 
☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
☐ White or European American 
☐ Other  __________________________________ 
                                                    
4.  What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? 
☐ Less than high school 
☐ High School degree or equivalent 
☐ College graduate 
☐ Post graduate degree
 
 
Appendix E: Research Assistant Script in Study 1 
<<Bring both individuals into small lab after verifying ID>>  
<<Go over informed consent>> 
 
Thank you both for agreeing to participate. As we talked about in the informed consent, you both 
will be watching videos and participating in a task together. However, you will each play a 
different role in that task. To decide who is doing what, please pick a number from this hat. 
 
<<Leave P1-Witness, take P2-Admin out to waiting area>> 
<<Tell P2-Admin they can do puzzles>> 
<<Go back into small lab>> 
 
Thanks for waiting. I’m going to play a short video for you now. Please pay attention. You will 
be asked some questions about it afterwards. 
 
<<Play video; sit inside room; do nothing>> 
 
What you just witnessed was a crime recorded on a security camera. We are interested in your 
memory for the culprit. In a few minutes you will participate in a photographic lineup conducted 
by the other participant; in the lineup you will be asked to try and identify the culprit. I’m going 
to take you out to the waiting area now. Do you have any questions before we leave? 
 
<<Answer any questions>> 
 
Okay, please do not discuss what was on the video with the other participant. 
 
<<Take P1-Witness out; and tell them to do puzzles, check watch>>  Time:  ______________ 
<<Take P2-Admin into room>> 
 
The Manhattan district attorney has hired us to consult on a criminal case. The procedure you are 
participating in today will help us form a scientifically based expert opinion that we will testify 
to in court. 
 
The other participant just saw security camera footage of an individual committing the crime in 
question. We would like you to play the part of a law enforcement officer conducting an 
investigation into the matter. Specifically we want you to conduct a photographic lineup where 
you will see if the other participant can identify the culprit from the video in a set of six 
photographs. 
 
Importantly, you need to know that there is a real suspect in custody. The suspect is currently 
charged with robbery, burglary, and assault. The results of your lineup will aid us in forming our 
sworn testimony about whether the recording implicates the suspect.  
 
Begin manipulation 1(AB) alternative 
A. <<Nothing>> 





It is important for the real case that you try to obtain an identification of the suspect. 
 
I’m going to show you a short video on how to conduct a photographic lineup and then give you 
more instructions. Do you have any questions? 
 
<<Answer questions; start video>> 
 
Okay, here are the materials for your lineup (envelope, identification form). This envelope 
contains six photos.  
 
<<Take out and show>> 
 
They are numbered so you can record the choice of the other participant. 
 
Begin manipulation 3(EF) 
Begin E: There is a suspect but I cannot tell you who it is. 
Begin F: The suspect is number _________, which is this one. 
End 
 
Your goal is to get the witness to identify the suspect. You may conduct the lineup in any way 
you see fit. You may do or ask anything you want even if it was not depicted in the training 
video. E: <<nothing>> F: However, you may not blatantly tell the witness which photo is the 
suspect.  
 
Begin manipulation 2(CD) 
Begin C: <<nothing>> 
Begin D: Now, if the other participant identifies the suspect, we will give you a reward of 25 
dollars. This is on top of your guaranteed payment of 20 dollars that you will get regardless. Do 
you understand? <<Make sure they understand>> 
End 
  
When the witness makes a choice, you can record it here <<show form>>. There is space to 
check the box next to each photo number and also a box to check if the witness can’t or won’t 
make an identification. You must also obtain their confidence in their choice by asking two 
questions. The first asks them to describe (his or her) confidence in her own words, the second 
asks her to describe her confidence on a scale from 0, not at all confident, to 100, completely 
confident. For both questions, there are separate lines where you can record the answers.  
 
When you are done, step outside where I am sitting and let me know that you are finished. 
 
Do you have any-more questions before we begin? 
 
<<Answer questions; go get P1-Witness>> 




Okay, we are ready to begin the lineup. Before I take you in I need to read you some instructions. 
The other participant, playing the role of the law enforcement, is about to conduct a lineup for 
you.  
 
Begin manipulation 3 (EF) 
E: We have a suspect but the administrator does not know which photo depicts the suspect. 
F: The administrator has a suspect in the crime you witnessed and would like to see if you can 
identify him from the lineup.  
End. 
 
Remember that the culprit’s appearance may have changed and that he may not appear as he did 
in the video. Also know that the actual culprit from the video may or may not be present in the 
lineup you are about to see. Are you ready? 
 
<<Take them in and then sit outside, behind closed door>> 
<<Wait for lineup to take place>> 
<<When lineup is done, make sure form is filled out, take identification form>> 
<<Take P2-admin to desk>> 
<<Handout post questionnaires>> 
<<When done PI will debrief and pay>> 
 
 
Appendix F: Informed Consent Document Study 1 
 
Title of Research Study:  Legal Decision Making 
 
Principal Investigator:  Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D.  
       Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar 
 
Co-Principal Investigator:  Andrew J. Evelo, M.A. 
         Doctoral Candidate 
 
Research Sponsor: Funded by a 2017 Graduate Center Dissertation 
Fellowship and the National Science Foundation 
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study because 18 years of age or older and 
a resident of the United States. The purpose of this research study is to examine decision 
making in a common legal setting. If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we 
will ask you to watch a video. Afterwards, you will participate in a short task with another 
participant and then answer some questions. For scientific reasons, this consent form does 
not include complete information about the purpose of this research. You will be fully 
debriefed following your participation in the research. We anticipate it will take 
approximately 45 minutes. 
 
The potential risks associated with this study are minimal.  You will receive no direct benefits 
from your participation. For your time, you will be compensated $20 cash at the end of the 
study. If you are a CUNY student volunteering through SONA, you will also receive 2 Research 
Experience Program (REP) points, which can also be obtained through other studies or class 
research alternatives. 
 
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected 
during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only 
with your permission or as required by law. We will protect your confidentiality by replacing 
your direct identifying information (e.g., names, contact info) with codes. Only the principle 
investigators will be able to pair your data with your name. This data will be stored for future 
research. Publications, presentations, and data repositories that result from this study will 
not contain this identifying information.  
 
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. You can decide to withdraw 
your consent and stop participating in the research at any time, without any penalty. If you 
are a CUNY student, your willingness to participate in this research study, or your request to 
withdraw from the research study, will not affect your grades or academic standing. 
 
 
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of 
the following researchers: 
 




Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D. (Principal Investigator and Faculty Advisor) 
Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar 
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or 
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call 
the CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email at HRPP@cuny.edu. 
Alternately, you can write to: 
 
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research 
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator 
205 East 42nd Street 
New York, NY 10017 
 
Signature of Participant 
 
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be 
given a copy of this consent form to keep.  
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Participant 
 
 
_____________________________________________________  __________________________ 
Signature of Participant     Date  
 
 
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
 
_____________________________________________________  __________________________ 
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent   Date
 
 
Appendix G: Video Informed Consent Document in Study 1 
I understand that the lineup procedure I participated in was videotaped. The experimenter has 
explained to me why it was necessary to videotape the session. I have been given an opportunity 
to view my tape, decline the use of my tape, and erase my tape before anyone else has the 
opportunity to view it. 
 
The experimenter has gone over my three options for the use of my videotaped data. These 
include: 
 
_____ I give permission for my videotape to be used for public demonstrations of the 
phenomena studied in the experiment in which I am participating. This means that the 
video may be shown to professional groups as a demonstration or be analyzed or used as 
stimulus material for future studies. While names and identifying data will not be 
mentioned, it is possible that you could be recognized in the videos. I also allow my 
videotape to be analyzed by the researchers. 
 
_____  I give permission for the researchers of this study to use my videotape for data analysis, 
for research assistants to view and code the videotape, and for further research purposes. 
However, I do NOT give permission for my videotaped data to be used in PUBLIC 
demonstrations.  
 
_____ I do not give permission for my video tape to be used and would like my videotape 
destroyed.  
 
I have read the above statement and give my permission for the researchers to use my videotape 
data for the purposes I have indicated above. 
  
 
__________________________________                         ___________________ 








Appendix H: Video Coding Forms in Study 1 
 
1. Time of lineup: 
 Minutes Seconds  
Lineup start:   When did envelope open? 
Lineup end:   
When is the last time that the witness orally 
expresses or confirms their final ID decision? 
 
2. Overall pressure to choose (anyone): (circle one) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
  
3. Pressure to pick a particular photo: (circle one for each photo) 
 Exerted strong 
pressure on 




witness not to 
choose photo 
Did not exert 
any pressure at 










#1 -2 -1 0 1 2 
#2 -2 -1 0 1 2 
#3 -2 -1 0 1 2 
#4 -2 -1 0 1 2 
#5 -2 -1 0 1 2 
#6 -2 -1 0 1 2 
 
4. Which photo do you think is the suspect? (Make a mark next to your best guess if possible) 
☐ Photo #1 
☐ Photo #2 
☐ Photo #3 
☐ Photo #4 
☐ Photo #5 





 1:☐ Said he/she was a detective/cop/law enforcement(etc.) 
 2:☐ Told the witness to take their time 
 3:☐  Told the witness to look carefully 
 4:☐  Asked/prompted the witness to describe the features of the perpetrator 
 5:☐  Asked/prompted witness to compare photographs 
 6:☐ Added emphasis while administering/displaying a photograph/s 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐    ??☐   
 7:☐ Pointed or tapped at a photo/s 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐    ??☐ 
 8:☐ Asked about a specific photo/s 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
 9:☐ Said "it seems like you're looking a long time at this photo" 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
10:☐ Asked the witness to think about a photograph from another angle or profile 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
11:☐ Showed pleasure when the witness made an ID (e.g., smile, nod, +vocal) 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
12:☐ Showed displeasure when the witness made an ID (e.g., frown, head-shake, -vocal) 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
13:☐ Asked "are you sure" after an ID was made 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
14:☐ Removed photos/allowed photos to be removed 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
15:☐ Returned photos/allowed photos to be returned 
Photos: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐     ??☐ 
16:☐ Had the witness to take another look after initially rejecting the lineup 
17:☐ Had the witness to take another look after making an initial ID 
18:☐ Repeated witness’s choice in questioning manner 
19:☐ Paused before recording the ID and uttered "okay" or similar hedge 
20:☐ Told the witness he/she knows which photo is of the suspect 
21:☐ Told the witness he/she does not know which photo is of the suspect 
22:☐ Told the witness that this is for a real case 
23:☐ Mentioned financial bonus of some sort 
24:☐ Mentioned that the suspect confessed 
Witness Behavior 
 1:☐ The witness changed his/her lineup choice after an initial identification 
Original choice:  #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐    Reject☐    ??☐ 
Final choice: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐    Reject☐    ??☐ 
 2:☐ The witness changed his/her confidence 
If you were the administrator in this case, how would you record the choice of the witness? 
1. Choice: #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐    Reject☐    ??☐ 
2. Numeric confidence: ______________________
 
 
Appendix I: Witness Questionnaire in Study 2 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements by checking a 
box on the scale below: 
 
1.  During the video, I had a good view of the perpetrator. 












2. During the video, I had a good opportunity to view the perpetrator’s face. 












3. I paid attention to the perpetrator during the videotaped crime. 












4. I felt that it was easy to make a lineup decision. 












5. I made a lineup decision quickly. 











   
6. I would be willing to testify about my lineup decision at trial. 












7. I have a good memory for strangers’ faces. 












8. I can clearly see the image of the perpetrator in my mind. 















9. I would trust an eyewitness who had a similar viewing experience to mine. 












10. My lineup decision would provide useful information for the police if this were a real-life 
criminal investigation. 












11. The administrator pressured me to identify someone in this lineup. 












12. The lineup administrator was trying to get me to pick a particular person in the lineup. 












13. The administrator of this lineup was fair and impartial throughout the lineup administration. 












14. The administrator’s behavior while conducting the lineup influenced my identification 
decision. 












15. All things considered, the lineup administration was fair and unbiased. 























And some additional questions: 
 
3. During the video, how far away was the perpetrator from the camera.  
 
_______ feet _______ inches 
 
4. During the video, how long was the perpetrator’s face in your view? 
 
_______ seconds  
 
5. Do you think the administrator knew who the suspect is? (check one) 
☐ Yes 
☐ No  
 
6. Were you told the importance of identifying the suspect? (check one) 
☐ Yes 
☐ No  
☐ I don’t remember 
 
7. Were you offered any financial compensation for identifying the suspect (other than $20 for 
participating)? (check one) 
☐ Yes, $___________ (specify amount) 
☐ No  
☐ I don’t remember 
 
8. On the following scale, how difficult was it to complete the lineup task while listening to the 
tones? 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 











9. On the following scale, how motivated were you to identify the suspect? 
 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




















Instructions: Finally, please tell us a little about yourself. 
 
1.  What is your age?  _________________ 
 
2. What Gender do you identify with? 
☐ Male  
☐ Female 
☐ Other __________________________________ 
 
3. With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify with? 
☐ American Indian or Alaskan Native 
☐ Asian 
☐ Black or African American 
☐ Hispanic, Latino, or Latina 
☐ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
☐ White or European American 
☐ Other  __________________________________ 
                                                    
4.  What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? 
☐ Less than high school 
☐ High School degree or equivalent 
☐ College graduate 
☐ Post graduate degree 
 
 
Appendix J: Research Assistant Script in Study 2 
<<Go over informed consent>> 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate. As we talked about in the informed consent, you will be 
watching a video and participating in some psychological tasks.  
 
First, I’m going to play a short video for you now. Please pay attention. You will be asked some 
questions about it afterwards. 
 
<<Play Video>> <<Sit Down>> 
 
<<Stand>> What you just witnessed was a crime recorded on a security camera. We are 
interested in your memory for the culprit. In a few minutes you will participate in a photographic 
lineup conducted by an administrator from our lab; in the lineup you will be asked to try and 
identify the culprit.  
 
In addition to the lineup, we have three memory and attention tasks we would like you to 
perform. These measures will give us a better understanding of your underlying abilities.  
 
The first is a word search puzzle. Here is the packet << take out word search >>, please leave it 
face down until I tell you to begin. There are two word search puzzles in the packet with a total 
of 43 words. We are interested in your attention to the puzzle and in how many words you are 
able to find. They may be hidden in any direction: up, down, diagonal, backwards, or forwards. 
You have 5 minutes to find as many words as you can. We do not expect that you will find them 
all—and that is perfectly fine. If you do find them all, you may spend the extra time checking 
your answers. I will time you on this timer. 
 
Do you have any questions before we begin?  <<Answer any questions>> 
 
Okay are you ready? You may turn over your word search now. 
 
<<Start timer, sit against wall>> <<if they ask questions redirect>> 
 
Time. Please put your pen down. 
 
Very good, I will collect that. 
 
<<Sit at table>> It is now time for the lineup and the second attention task.  
 
After I explain the tasks, I will go get another researcher who will conduct the lineup. The lineup 
administrator has a suspect in the crime you witnessed and would like to see if you can identify 
him from the lineup.  
 




D: Now, if you identify that suspect, we will reward you with an additional $25. This is on top of 
your guaranteed payment of 20 dollars that you will get regardless. Do you understand?  
End Manipulation 
 
You will be performing the second attention task AT THE SAME TIME you are participating in 
the lineup. This is an auditory task. During the lineup, you must listen to a prerecorded track on 
headphones. The track will play a number of tones.  
 
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB) 
A: Your task is simply to listen to the tones play while the lineup takes place. 
B: Your task is to identify the tones and keep track of how many you have heard. At the end of 
the lineup, I will come back into this room and ask HOW MANY tones you heard. We are 
interested in how close you are able to get to the correct number of tones. 
End Manipulation 
 
To give you an idea of what this task is like, we will first practice together with a 1 min practice 
track. Go ahead and remove these headphones from the plastic and place them in this IPod. Can 
you still hear me with the headphones on? Good. Remember the tones will be occurring at the 
same time you are interacting with the lineup administrator. 
 
I will start the track now. <<Play “Practice”>><<Wait for 1 minute track to end>> 
 
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB) 
A: Good, were you able to hear the tones? 
B: Good. How many tones did you hear? (4 is correct).  
Correct: Good, that is correct. 
Incorrect: Actually, the correct answer was four.  
End Manipulation 
 
That is it for practice. For the actual task, I will start the track and leave the room. Very shortly 
after I start the track, the lineup administrator will come in to conduct the lineup. It is important 
that you do both tasks at the same time.  
 
Begin Manipulation 2 (CD): 
C: <<nothing>> 
D: Remember, if you identify the suspect, we will reward you with an additional $25.  
End Manipulation 
 
Do you have any questions before we begin? <<Answer questions>> 
 
Okay are you ready? Excellent, here we go…<<Tell to put headphones back in if they are out>> 
 
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB): 
A: <<Play track “Simple”>> <<TURN OVER I POD>> 




<<Come back to office>><<Wait for lineup to be finished>> 
<<Go back in>><<Turn over IPod, stop track>> 
<<Turn over IPod, stop track>> 
 
Begin Manipulation 1 (AB): 
A: If you had to guess, about how many tones did you hear? 
B: How many tones did you hear? 
End Manipulation 
Track Time  
Number of Tones  
 
Okay, it is time for the third and final task. This is just a short questionnaire for you to fill out. 
We want to know a bit about you, your memory, and the other tasks you completed today. Take 
your time and—when you are done—just wait here. In a few minutes the research coordinator 
will be in to pay you and answer any questions you have. 
 
 
Appendix K: Informed Consent Document in Study 2 
Title of Research Study:  Legal Decision Making 
 
Principal Investigator:  Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D.  
       Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar 
 
Co-Principal Investigator:  Andrew J. Evelo, M.A. 
         Doctoral Candidate 
 
Research Sponsor: Funded by a 2017 Graduate Center Dissertation 
Fellowship and the National Science Foundation 
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study because you are 18 years of age or 
older and a resident of the United States. The purpose of this research study is to examine 
decision making in a common legal setting. If you volunteer to participate in this research 
study, we will ask you to watch a video and then participate in some tasks. For scientific 
reasons, this consent form does not include complete information about the purpose of this 
research. You will be fully debriefed following your participation in the research. We 
anticipate it will take approximately 45 minutes. 
 
The potential risks associated with this study are minimal.  You will receive no direct benefits 
from your participation. For your time, you will be compensated $20 cash at the end of the 
study.  
 
We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected 
during this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only 
with your permission or as required by law. We will protect your confidentiality by replacing 
your direct identifying information (e.g., names, contact info) with codes. Only the principle 
investigators will be able to pair your data with your name. This data will be stored for future 
research. Publications, presentations, and data repositories that result from this study will 
not contain this identifying information.  
 
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. You can decide to withdraw 





If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to one of 








Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D. (Principal Investigator and Faculty Advisor) 
Professor of Psychology, Presidential Scholar 
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or 
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call 
the CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email at HRPP@cuny.edu. 
Alternately, you can write to: 
 
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research 
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator 
205 East 42nd Street 
New York, NY 10017 
 
Signature of Participant 
 
If you agree to participate in this research study, please sign and date below. You will be 
given a copy of this consent form to keep.  
 
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Participant 
 
 
_____________________________________________________  __________________________ 
Signature of Participant     Date  
 
 
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
 
_____________________________________________________    
Printed Name of Individual Obtaining Consent 
 
 
_____________________________________________________  __________________________ 
Signature of Individual Obtaining Consent   Date 
 
 
Appendix L: Administrator Steering Script in Study 2 
 
Suspect will now always be in the second position 
When you place two down, pause and add emphasis with voice 
Anytime two mentioned double tap the suspect photo twice (mentalist trick) 
 
 
Obtain Correct ID 
 
If leaning toward Number 2 
 Get that ID 
 
1. The witness is there;  
• “Excellent, so how confident in that decision”…get confidence 
• “Perfect…” 
 
2. The witness needs a push:  
• “Good, so 2 resemble the culprit? How similar?” 
• “Isn’t that enough for ID” 
• “Okay that’s pretty good, should we choose him? 
• “Good, what about Number 2, resembles the target?” 
• “Does 2 most resemble the target?” 





If needs steering  
These are three tools to use if no Suspect ID  
Use as feel natural, definitely no more than 10 seconds dead time 
Feel free to use your own words to reach the same goal 
Use as they come naturally in flow of conversation 
You should definitely try using each one at least once 
You are encouraged to use multiple times if need be 
    
3. Prodding: get witness to mention target. Once they mention the target then stay on that target, 
writing down information and seeming happy (repeat as necessary) 
• “Which features in the photos (of each picture) resemble the culprit?” 
• “Is there anyone who looks most like the culprit?” 
• “Remember, sometime they can look a bit differently.” 
• “is there anyone who looks 
• “You paused (or something) on 2, what else about 2” 
• “What about 2, do you recognize 2” 
• “Is there anyone who looks most like the culprit” 
• “What about if you looked at 2 from a different angle” 
 
 
4. Elimination: The idea here is to naturally make the lineup smaller while keeping the suspect 
in the lineup. You can do this by moving pictures, rearranging pictures, turning pictures over, or 
putting pictures back in the envelope… whatever feels natural in the context. The witness may 
naturally eliminate, or say it’s not one of the pictures. You may need to suggest if other 
techniques aren’t working. 
• “Good, so let’s get rid of him” 
• “Okay, let’s put him over to the side” 
• “Good, let’s just deal with this row” 
• “I think we should leave him out” 
• “Let’s just deal with these photos” 
• “Why don’t we stick with these?” 
 
5. Suggest alternatives: the idea here is to get the witness to compare photos, one of which is 
the suspect. This may work in a variety of circumstances without focusing only on 2, without 
removing pictures, or after you have already removed pictures. 
• “I saw you focus on the top row, are any of these three similar to the culprit” 
• “So of these two do you have a preference” 
• “What about these two/three/four stick out” 
• “So do you think its Number 2, or would you rather say tis no one” (emphasis) 
 
 
Allowing a Foil or Rejection 
  
If witness wants to make a bad choice 
If all techniques have been tried at least once  
None seem to be working 
Only then can you suggest that you will unhappily accept the wrong answer. 
 
6. Showing Displeasure: the idea here is two show displeasure and offer chances for them to 
rethink their decision and make another choice. You want to make it clear that they are making 
the wrong choice. You must give them three chances to rethink. You can use your own words 
though. Example: 
1. “Okay, are you sure? Why don’t you look again? 
2. “Okay if you want that can be your final choice… but this is very important, and I’d 
like for you to look again” 
“Okay, I guess that’s fine if you are really confident” 
 
 
Appendix M: Video Informed Consent Document in Study 2 
I understand that the lineup procedure I participated in was videotaped. The experimenter has 
explained to me why it was necessary to videotape the session. I have been given an opportunity 
to view my tape, decline the use of my tape, and erase my tape before anyone else has the 
opportunity to view it. 
 
The experimenter has gone over my two options for the use of my videotaped data. These 
include: 
 
_____  I give permission for the researchers associated with this project to use, view, and 
analyze my videotape. The video will not be shown to others or be used for future 
research projects. 
 
_____ I do not give permission for my video tape to be used and would like my videotape 
deleted.  
 
I have read the above statement and give my permission for the researchers to use my videotape 
data for the purposes I have indicated above. 
  
 
__________________________________                         ___________________ 







Appendix N: Video Coding Forms in Study 2 
 
1. Time of lineup: 
 Minutes Seconds  
Lineup start:   When did envelope open? 
Lineup end:   
When is the last time that the witness orally 
expresses or confirms their final ID decision? 
 
2. Overall pressure to choose (anyone): (circle one) 
1 2 3 4 5 




 1:☐ The witness changed his/her lineup choice after an initial identification 
Original choice:  #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐    Reject☐    ??☐ 
Final choice:  #1☐     #2☐     #3☐     #4☐     #5☐     #6☐    Reject☐    ??☐ 
 2:☐ The witness changed his/her confidence 
 
 Initial confidence ______________________ 
 
 Final confidence ______________________ 
 
Administrator 
Who was the administrator? 
 ☐ Raquel 
 ☐ Amanda 
 ☐ Kelsey 
 ☐ Jane 
 ☐ Audrey 
 ☐ Paloma 
 ☐ Denisha 
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